Celebrating Women Leaders Luncheon
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Washington, DC

Karen DeYoung, *The Washington Post*
Jill Dougherty, CNN
Siobhan Gorman, *The Wall Street Journal*
Elisabeth Bumiller (Moderator), *The New York Times*

Voices of Women Journalists
Covering Foreign Policy Hotspots

Elisabeth Bumiller: Thank you all for coming. My name is Elisabeth Bumiller, *New York Times* Deputy Washington Bureau Chief and today's moderator of the Women's Foreign Policy Group's Celebrating Women Leaders Luncheon, Voices of Women Journalists Covering Foreign Policy Hot Spots. We have a great panel today. Some of my colleagues I've known for a long time in Washington, Karen DeYoung, the senior national security correspondent and associate editor of *The Washington Post* is here. [*Applause.*] We have Siobhan Gorman, from *The Wall Street Journal*. She covers intelligence and the National Security Agency and the CIA. [*Applause.*] And then we have Jill Dougherty, who is a CNN foreign affairs correspondent who has been all over the world. You see her constantly on television. [*Applause.*] They are going to take us behind the scenes and talk about Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, the NSA surveillance policies and other foreign policy and national security issues.

So, we're looking forward to this discussion. Last time I was here at an event it was interviewing my boss, Jill Abramson of *The New York Times*. It was rather stressful for me but I got through it. [*Laughter.*] It was a really good event. It's now my honor and privilege to introduce the co-founder and president of the Women's Foreign Policy's Group, Patricia Ellis.

Patricia Ellis: First of all, I am thrilled that all of you could join us today and show your support for the Women's Foreign Policy Group as we celebrate our eighteenth year, very exciting. [*Applause.*] So in only two years we're going to have a bang-up celebration, so mark your calendars if you have them that far out. As we celebrate promoting women's leadership and women's voices in international affairs I want to thank Elisabeth Bumiller—who is an outstanding journalist and until recently she was *The Times* Pentagon correspondent, who has participated in many of our programs—for joining us one again. And also thanks to Karen who's another one of our regulars, it's great to have them back with us. It's truly exciting to be here with such an accomplished group of women leaders. It shows the breadth of the WFPG family, so I would like to begin by recognizing my wonderful board members: Carolyn Brehm, Dawn Calabia, Isabel Jasinowski, Gail Leftwich Kitch and Theresa Loar—please stand. [*Applause.*] It's such a pleasure to work with them. They're fantastic. Now a special thanks to WFPG associate director Kimberly Kahnhauser—I hope she's somewhere in the room. She coordinated this event and a special thanks to her and to the interns and all the volunteers. We wouldn't be here without them. [*Applause.*] Next, a special thank you to our Host Steering Committee. I am going to ask everyone on the Host Steering Committee to please stand so we can applaud you. So, Shaista is one—yes we have Carolyn, Gail, Dawn, Theresa, thank you so much. [*Applause.*]

And now I want to thank our sponsors. I will begin with our venue sponsor the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center and Andrew Gelfuso, our sponsors, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and Maxine Isaacs. Our Supporters, the Ann and Ronald Abramson Family Foundation,

CH2M Hill, Host Hotels and Resorts, and Procter & Gamble. Thank you very much. And our Special Friends, NAFSA: Association of International Educators and Shahin Mafi. Thank you all once again. [*Applause.*] We are honored to have a number of ambassadors here with us today, so I would I would—and they also serve on our Honorary Committee—and I'd like to recognize them by asking the women ambassadors to stand first, since this is the Women's Foreign Policy Group, thank you. And now I would like to recognize their male colleagues and all other diplomats. Please stand. [*Applause.*] We have the Ambassador of the Philippines, our colleague from the German Embassy, etc. [*Applause.*] So, this has been a really great year for the WFPG. We've have held nearly 40 programs, which is just really amazing and there is one more to go this year so I want to mention it. It is one of our Embassy Series events, which will be on December 2nd hosted by the Ambassador of the Philippines. So thank you so much Ambassador and we hope that you can all attend. We have another one—please mark your calendars—for January [16th]. The Mexican Ambassador will be hosting an event for us so that will be very special, so something to look forward to in the New Year.

We kicked off 2013 with Karen DeYoung and David Sanger. They were talking about—all good things come around—they were talking about foreign policy and national security challenges facing the second Obama administration. And since then we've held events on pressing issues from Egypt and Syria to Burma, Iran. We've been hosted by numerous embassies including Algeria, Greece, Indonesia, Switzerland, Estonia, Croatia and Slovenia. We held State Department briefings with senior US officials, great Author Series events on Mexico, Saudi Arabia and US Special Forces. And we had this wonderful event that Elisabeth mentioned with Jill Abramson, the first women executive editor of *The New York Times*. So last but not least, I want to mention our annual mentoring fairs in which a number of you have participated—we hold them in both New York and Washington. It's a great experience and mark your calendars again. February 5th is the DC mentoring fair. It's a great way to give back to the next generation and we hope as many of you as possible can participate.

So I just want to thank all our supporters, all our members. We couldn't be here without you. We need all of your support to continue to highlight women's voices, their contributions and also to help the next generation. So thank you to those who are part of the family and to those who are not we hope you will join us as a member. There are materials on your table. And also I want to remind you to fill out the question cards on the table, which we will use. They will be submitted to Elisabeth. They'll be integrated into the discussion that we will have after lunch. I just want to say a fond farewell to someone a lot of us know here in this room, Rosa Djalal, who is the wife of the Indonesian Ambassador, and they will be leaving shortly. She has been a good friend of the organization and so thank you so much Rosa. [*Applause.*]

I just want to thank you all so much again for coming to honor women journalists—certainly a subject near and dear to my heart as a former journalist who covered foreign policy and national security. I now invite you to enjoy your lunch and we'll be back shortly with the program. Thank you. [*Applause.*]

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Bumiller: I hope you enjoyed your lunch. I'm going to just tell you about the format here. I'm going to introduce our three panelists and just tell you briefly about them and then I'm going to ask each of them to speak, about five minutes, no more. And then I'm going to ask each of them about two questions—two or three questions—and then I will collect the cards from all of you and have you ask your questions that way. So our first panelist is Karen DeYoung. Karen and I used to travel together on George W. Bush trips and to all sorts of funny places. As you know she is the national security correspondent and associate editor of *The Washington Post*. She is recently back from a trip with Secretary Kerry to the Middle East and Europe, a very long trip, which focused on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks—I know you read about it—Syria and Iran. She is going to have lots to tell us. The next speaker is Siobhan Gorman who covers intelligence for *The Wall Street Journal* and she also writes about terrorism, counterterrorism, cyber-security, including the activities of the sixteen American

intelligence agencies. And recently, not surprisingly, her reporting has focused on the NSA surveillance scandal and privacy issues and also on its impact on US relationships with its allies. And the third, but hardly the last speaker, is Jill Dougherty, again from CNN the foreign affairs correspondent. She reports on news from the State Department, does a lot of news analysis, [and] has focused most recently on Russia. And also, she was telling us before lunch started, on North Korea. Okay, Karen?

DeYoung: Thank you, thanks Elisabeth and thank you all. It's great to be back here. I was going to talk just a little bit about the issues that Elisabeth mentioned in context of John Kerry and how he is doing—as we like to call him, the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. We were going on a trip with him, you never quite know how long it will take or where you're going to go, which in some ways is invigorating and interesting, in other ways is kind of exhausting and puzzling in policy terms. On this recent trip we started out—the schedule was we would be gone for four days. We would go to Poland, to Algeria and to Morocco for reasons that were not entirely clear for any of those stops. As it turned we were gone for eleven days and we went to Poland, again for reasons that weren't entirely clear, but that was the only one of the original stops. Kerry is very different than Hillary Clinton in the sense that Clinton, although she had her moments of spontaneity, was very well scripted in terms of where she was going to go and what she was going to say and what the sort of deliverables of any particular visit were.

Kerry is quite different. He changes plans on the spur of the moment. He's willing to go and insert himself into an issue without any real assurance that he will succeed in delivering anything and sees it more as part of a process rather than an end point. I think this recent trip was kind of a case-in-point where we started out in Egypt—he was the highest US official to visit there since the coup that happened last summer. And we went very quickly from there to Riyadh—where certainly the Saudis and many others in the Persian Gulf are not at all happy with US policy, primarily in Syria but also in Egypt—went from there to Poland where we looked at some F16's and came back, and from Poland to again another stop in the Mid-East peace process, back and forth between three meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu, two meetings with President Abbas. Nothing really to announce at the end of it, but I think as Kerry says he feels like there had been a dearth of US diplomacy. That the time is right for something to happen and that he needs to personally, in a very sort of senatorial way, be present without really having anything to announce and the end of it, just to keep the process going.

Also talked a lot about Syria and then all of a sudden we went to Geneva, which was not on the schedule at all, because Catherine Ashton, who was the Foreign Policy Chief for the European Union, had decided that the lower level negotiators there were actually on the verge of reaching a deal and also because the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Zarif who had been doing the negotiating, largely for Iran, felt like past a certain point of agreement that he really would like his counterparts there, as Foreign Minister, to continue the negotiations. So Kerry decided all of a sudden that he was going to go. And then of course the other members of the P5+1 felt like if Kerry was going to go they better go. So all of a sudden within a day everyone upended their schedules and there we were in Geneva. As you know, the final deal was not reached, although I do think they came quite close and they've gone back to negotiate this week and I think Kerry may actually go this weekend if in fact it looks like they are on the verge of a deal. But who knows, it may not be a deal. And we can go in the questions and talk about the specifics of the agreement would be and what the sticking points are in the agreement.

But I think the other question to ask about Kerry is the extent to which his priorities and the way he spends his time is actually part of some great strategic plan of the Obama administration's foreign policy. Or if in fact they are letting him just go out on his own and if he succeeds great, they take credit and if he fails to bad it's his fault. And I think the answer is not in on that yet. I think he could, certainly with Syria, the Middle East and with Iran, there could be agreements and it would all look like it was worthwhile and exactly the way to play it. There could not be any progress in any of those areas, in which case I think he will come into some very harsh criticism. In the meantime, a lot of other foreign policy priorities in particularly the Asia pivot and other things, Russia, other things that the

administration has said are important, Kerry has paid virtually no attention to as far as I can tell and I'll stop there.

Bumiller: So I think we want to go to Siobhan, so Siobhan?

Siobhan Gorman: On to a somewhat different topic, I actually kind of thought that I was going to spend my summer and beyond focusing on the intelligence questions on Syria and instead Edward Snowden ended up providing this rather large news story for us and that's what I've spent a fair amount of time dealing with in the last few months and so I just thought that I'd share a few thoughts on that because it's obviously weighed heavily on both domestic and foreign policy for the US. So, I'll go through a little bit on the domestic side and then kind of switch over to the foreign policy implications. And obviously any of that can be further discussed later.

As someone who has covered the National Security Agency for a number of years at this point, I was a little surprised, actually, when the Snowden disclosures, when they started dribbling out, created such a response because I had been through the previous hemorrhaging back in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, when *The Time*s disclosed the warrantless surveillance program and everyone was up in arms for a while and then Congress turned around and basically ratified the program and said, "Okay you can do what you've been doing, but now we'll have the court oversee it as well and now you can do it a little more expansively than what you were doing previously." And, you know, since 2008, the issue had essentially been dormant and initially the Snowden disclosures had been the kinds of things that had kind of already been reported previously. I mean the first story that came out had to do with the NSA's program that collects the phone records of nearly all Americans and it had been reported back in 2006 that NSA was creating a database of millions of phone numbers. I remember actually standing in my kitchen at eight o'clock at night when that story came from my blackberry. My editor had sent it to me and had said, "What do we think of this?" and I said, "Is this news?" [*Laughter.*] And he said, "Yeah, you know the editors in New York are really freaking out about it, we should take a look." And I'm just scrolling through my phone trying to have dinner and I click on the link and I say, "Oh my god, there's an intelligence surveillance court order here!" And so you can tell that this was something that was a little bit of a different sort of animal from the types of stories that we had all been writing previously because the idea that a FISA court order being public, I had only encountered one time when one had even been de-classified and shown to the public.

So, I think that one of the reasons why the Snowden disclosures have had so much potency in the public debate is that there is—it has provided so much documentation to really show to some degree what the nature of this program is and I think perhaps even more importantly, because I think the disclosures themselves haven't necessarily—they've been important—but they haven't necessarily shown wrong-doing or anything like that but weirdly it's sort of shaken the trees and forced the government to admit to a whole host of wrong-doing, you know, violations of privacy, violations of court orders, that we never would have seen before the Snowden disclosures so actually I think that the fallout will prove to be more significant even than the information provided in the initial disclosures. And you know I actually think that one of the under-appreciated stories in all of this are the document dumps that the government has put out.

We've seen three really egregious examples of NSA just completely mishandling programs. So it's not necessarily—people can debate whether it's a drag-net or this, that, and the other thing—what we have seen is the court roundly criticizing national security agencies for not understanding its own programs, for presiding over programs that are so complex that not one person at NSA completely understands the whole thing, accidentally sweeping up tens of thousands of communications without knowing what they're doing, misrepresenting their programs to both their superiors at the Pentagon and the court. And we've seen this in the context of collecting internet data, collecting phone data, and collecting actual messages from taps on the US internet backbone. So, I think that's something that maybe people will focus on a little but more going down the line because you sort of have this odd narrative

where NSA is all-knowing and yet there is sort of this sub-narrative in the documents that we've seen that is highly questioning of NSA's competence. So I just think that that's an important thing to keep thinking about.

I want to turn a little bit to—and I think it's important to give NSA credit, it has said that it has moved to address these problems, that it did discover these problems on its own and it dutifully reported them, however, generally these issues went on for years before NSA even discovered that it was even committing these errors and so as Congress moves to discuss what should be done for over-sight of NSA, I think there are a lot of questions, including whether NSA has become sort of too big to fail post-9/11, that people should be asking, because you see these Court orders where judges outline all these violations and the programs essentially go on, they're modified but they kind of continue to move on because people think it's too important for national security to completely stop and rework everything and I just think that that's an important thing to consider now that we're so many years past 9/11.

Turning a little bit to the foreign relations issues, one of the things that has caught the folks in the government by surprise has actually been the uproar over the foreign spying element of all of these NSA programs, which is really the vast majority of it but, you know, it obviously came into focus with the tapping of Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone as well as a number of other world leaders and I think that the folks at NSA and the intelligence community were really taken aback by the uproar, I mean, even senators like the chairman of the of the Senate Intelligence Committee criticizing the NSA for doing these kinds of things when they say, "look this is what we were asked to do", and I think that there's still a pretty interesting debate to be had about how much intelligence agencies need to be factoring in diplomatic considerations, you know we've had some of that debate when it came to CIA's drone program and I think that we'll see some of that happening now as well as the surveillance arena, a lot of that is going on between the US and Germany, the US and Europe, but there's also just a broader international discussion to be had on that.

I think I'll probably stop there, because I think we have plenty of time for questions and things like that, but also happy to talk about Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Bumiller: Okay, great, thanks, Jill?

Jill Dougherty: Thank you, you know, my mission here is to basically talk about Russia and one of the—I come at this only as a current subject of interest of mine. But for a long time I had studied the Russian language, I was a Russian major in college, I was very interested in for a very long time and I went back to school, to Georgetown—I hate to tell you probably five years ago—following Hilary Clinton and John Kerry does not make it easy to go to class, but I eventually got to the point of writing a thesis and some of the people who are in that thesis are here today. And it was on this, what almost felt like an esoteric subject of soft power—Vladimir Putin's soft power. And in the beginning I didn't think I had a thesis, and now I think I really do, I had better because I submitted it last week and it's been approved, so apparently I made my point. But the point is, as I look at Russia right now, and what's happening on the world stage I see Russia's role really changing and a month or two ago I was there one of the questions was, "Is this a fluke?" and the fluke was a good fluke, it was the chemical weapons agreement with the United States concerning Syria. And as we all know, seemingly out of the blue, the Russians made a proposal, well John Kerry made an off-hand comment, which led to this proposal by the Russians, to deal with chemical weapons in Syria, the US said, "Yes, let's do it", and low and behold it seems to be working.

Now, I'm not going to get into whether that is the most important thing in Syria, because the war continues, but that's another subject. But as I looked at that, a few months ago I was thinking [it was] interesting that the modus vivendi, modus operandi of Russia had changed because before Russia's claim to fame was basically stopping things. At the UN, it would stop because it has the power to veto, it would stop proposals by the United States, on Syria and a whole lot of other things. And then all of

the sudden, here comes Russia being more "proactive," as we say here in Washington, a more proactive sense exerting its power and using a strategy which I think is being more and more developed by the day. For Russia to step out onto the world stage, influence what's going on, make proposals, and be involved in every single thing of any meaning, that's going on. I'll give you a couple of examples. Syria there's no question, we just went through that and that they're very active. Egypt, we heard last week, Russia sent a very top level delegation to Egypt which of course the United States is having real difficulty with, it's a complex issue in which the US is accused of making mistakes on both sides, you know, being friendly with the military government, being too friendly with the opposition, and each side is sniping at the United States. Into the breach comes Russia and they send their foreign minister, the defense minister there, talking about selling weapons to Egypt. Now whether this will turn into real arms sales, we'll have to see. It's, I think, a very interesting step.

Let's look at Iran. Netanyahu, of course, the Prime Minister of Israel is talking with the United States, but he has just flown to Moscow to talk to Vladimir Putin about Iran. And this comes, again, at a difficult and, well let's call it a delicate moment with international negotiations in Geneva on the Iranian nuclear program. So, you can say, Russia senses an opportunity and jumps into the breach. Let's see if there's anything else, well yes, internationally I think there are some other things we could look at almost anything that's out there the Russians I think, one or another, the Russians have maybe tangentially, maybe not as directly as the United States, but I really do feel that we're going to see a lot more of Russia. And I would call it a resurgent Russia, definitely a resurgent Russia.

Now the social issues, particularly you know when you look at soft power. Soft power, of course, is the ability to use your culture, let's say, Hollywood for the United States, its values as a democratic country, etc., to entice, induce people in other countries and other countries in general, to do what the United States wants them to do. And it's kind of like hard power except you don't have to spend the money on [the] weapons you do it by, you know, sending them a whole lot of movies from Hollywood. So, Russia, when it uses soft power has difficulty because a lot of what's going on domestically cuts against what it's trying to do. For example, Pussy Riot, regardless of what you think, we do have two young women in labor camps in Russia, under very difficult circumstances. So how do you spin that? How does Vladimir Putin make that look good? Well maybe in the sense he doesn't care, because domestically for a lot of Russians it works just fine. They don't think those girls should have been in a cathedral singing an obscene song about praying to Mary for the end of Vladimir Putin. So it works domestically. Greenpeace, you know, these Greenpeace activists mounted an oil platform in the middle of the Arctic—by the way, watch this page, Russia and the Arctic. Big area of development that a lot of people aren't really talking about but they're really active. Anyway, they arrested these people. As of this morning, I think they had freed about nine of them. Why would they do that? It looks bad, you know, why would they, why would they pull these guys into Murmansk, stick them in a prison? Well it's a very good shot over the bow, pun not intended, for other people who may want to go up to the Arctic and try to stop their development of natural resources—energy resources—in the Arctic.

And then finally, I'll get into, and then I'll end on this, but I think some of this anti-gay legislation that is really getting a lot of attention, the anti-gay propaganda bill that then became law, which has had a lot of attention in the United States, and around the world. Now you would wonder, why pay so much attention to that? You know, is it really that much of a big deal? Well, it works very well domestically. It works very well with the constituency that belongs to Vladimir Putin who tend to be less educated people in the hinterland. Moscow is totally, you know, when you look at Moscow and Saint Petersburg, they're quite anti-Putin, anti-establishment, but when you get out into the small towns in the hinterland people are big supporters of Vladimir Putin and this issue of gay rights is being exploited, I believe, by the Kremlin to curry favor among people in the hinterland. And it's also, and this is something I'm beginning to pay attention to, I think it's a work in progress, but I do think that Russia, now, in a big message way is depicting itself as the moral bastion of the civilized world. The message coming out of Russia is: Europe is corrupt, Europe is beyond hope, it's way too, just morally bankrupt. The United States is very much the same way, you know, gay marriage doesn't exist everywhere but is certainly

picking up steam so the US is also morally bankrupt. Who's left? Russia. With moral values, traditional, traditional moral values and this works well in the Middle East among conservative Islamic countries which do have traditional values more than, let's say the United States, Europe, and if anything Russia wants to be influential in the Middle East where it's had a pretty hard patch recently.

So, I'll end on the Sochi Olympics, which are coming up in February, I'm going to be covering them and you're going to see the gay issue very big, but you're going to see Vladimir Putin on the world stage making sure that this is a very big advertisement for Russia. How he'll do that? Mainly he has to make sure the terrorists don't attack, that's primary. Security is primary and that there are no embarrassing circumstances there or demonstrations and I'm sure that they're well equipped to keep any type of demonstration in hand. So, on that note, I think I'll end there.

Bumiller: Thank you, that was great, for all three. [*Applause.*] Okay, I think I'm going to ask two questions, to each of you guys, so, Karen, on the deal that may or may not be reached this weekend, the nuclear deal. It seems to assume some level of enrichment by Iran, whatever, some low level of enrichment. How will the Israelis live with that and what will Bibi [Netanyahu] do? I think is the big question.

DeYoung: Well, you know, the Israelis say that they can't live with it, but I think if that's the deal they won't have much of a choice. The NPT, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, doesn't really speak to enrichment; it doesn't say there is a right to enrichment as the Iranians say they have. But it doesn't say that there's a prohibition against enrichment either. There are, I think, 17 countries in the world, who enrich uranium. Iran doesn't see why it can't be one of them. And I think that the goal now is to keep the level low, to keep it at 3.5 or something below 5%. And that as far as the United States is concerned, although they're not going to say this now, at an end stage agreement, I think they've pretty much reconciled themselves to the fact that that's what they're going to have to live with. How they're going to sell that to Israel right now, again what they'll have to do is make sure that this particular agreement doesn't really speak to the long-term question of enrichment, it just freezes low level, at the moment, so there can be no more of this 20% enrichment during this interim phase, tries to deal with Iran's existing stockpile of—depending on what your definition of highly enriched uranium is—but 20% and tries to convince the Israelis that again, they always say that we'd rather have no deal than a bad deal, the Americans say, but try to convince the Israelis that this is not a bad deal. That in fact it's a good deal and with the proper verification you can keep Iranian enrichment down to a level that if they tried to break out of it at any point it would be very apparent to the rest of the world and the Iranians would be on notice of what would happen if they did that.

Bumiller: Let me just switch to Afghanistan for just one second because it was a big story in the papers today about the deal. So, and I always hate these questions but I'm going to ask you one myself; so imagine Afghanistan ten years from now, you go back as a journalist—what do you see in 2023 in Kabul and Helmand and Kandahar?

DeYoung: Well I think to some extent it depends on whether these deals are actually reached. The strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that was signed last year, lasts until 2024, and it promises a certain level of aid—the Tokyo agreement, the international donors conference that promises, I think it's up to $4 billion a year to Afghanistan and so you'll see on the non-security front, you know, I think you will see a certain development advancement. Although we will all be writing stories about a kind of Byzantium situation where these big hospitals and other infrastructure things that we've spent a lot of money on are sort of covered up with sand and don't and aren't functioning; or functioning at a level that we would not recognize as worth the expense and the effort that was put into them. On the security front, you know I guess I would say the best guess, assuming that there's not some kind of big explosion, is that the Taliban or their allies will continue to be the dominant power in southern Afghanistan. People like the Haqqanis, I mean they've been in Pakistan for so long, I don't know if they really, when faced with the reality of coming back to Afghanistan, if they'll

actually do that, but you know there's a certain part of Afghanistan, three provinces in the east that it's their traditional home and I think that the assumption, the unstated assumption, is that they will hold sway there. That the other tribal groups, people that we generally think of as being part the northern alignment, Uzbeks, will remain in power in the North, the Hazara will be through the middle of the country and that it will be a really decentralized kind of country. I mean this all assumes that the level of violence stays at a—it certainly won't go away—but stays at manageable level. So I think what you'll see, despite the efforts over the years on our part, to impose some kind centralized government system, I think you'll see it gradually become more and more decentralized and sort of, again, assuming that everyone doesn't start shooting at each other beyond a tolerable level it will go back to where Afghanistan traditionally has been.

Bumiller: And just a quick follow up. How many girls will be in school?

DeYoung: Well you know, the figure that the administration uses which is 8 million children in school, x-percent of them girls, has not changed as far as I know, for the last five years or so since they have been using that figure. So it certainly hasn't gone up, and I would suspect that while maybe in Kabul you'll see women at the university and in more urban areas, although perhaps not in Kandahar you'll see girls in school, but I would think that outside of those areas you're not going to see a lot of girls continuing to go to school.

Bumiller: And on that cheerful note [*Laughter*.] Siobhan, when you were at *The Baltimore Sun*, you wrote a story about—back in 2010—you wrote a story about, wasn't it 2010?

Gorman: I wasn't at *The Sun* in 2010.

Bumiller: So it would have been 2000—whatever. You wrote the story about Thomas Drake.

Gorman: I didn't. I have never written a story about Thomas Drake. [*Laughter*.]

Bumiller: Never mind, never mind, so here is my question, how, to what extent has—how difficult is it now as a national security reporter with all these leak investigations? That is the basis of the question. I mean it's—we've got a couple reporters at *The Times* under investigation. The Obama administration has prosecuted, done more leak investigations than any other, you know, way beyond what the Bush administration did. So how has that changed your reporting?

Gorman: You know it's interesting because it sort of goes up and down. I mean I think, you know, even back in—I don't know what was it, 2005 with the Judith Miller investigation and the Scooter Libby trial and everything, I think it kind of comes in waves and there will be sort of a sense of a chilling effect and then it will ease up for a year or two and then there will be some other major event. What's interesting is actually, I think that the—I mean the leak investigations, obviously have a chilling effect. I mean you have sources who at least want to take more precautions in communicating with you or don't return your calls and you aren't sure why. And we saw a whole state of those types of things occurring right before the Snowden leaks started, I mean there was the giant brouhaha over the government collecting the records on AP reporters. Then all of a sudden there's this huge leak from Snowden and I mean, I think I mentioned in my earlier talk that it has kind of shaken the trees and that's true actually on the source side as well it's been kind of a double edge sword. I mean there are some people who kind of have gone into hiding but I think that there are other people who feel kind of emboldened by it. Not in the sense that they want to be like Edward Snowden, they don't want their names to the information that they're providing, but I actually think that there's some sense among people who are privy to information about government activities they may think should be more of a part of the public debate in the national security arena, that maybe the right thing to do is to put it out there. We've seen

a real debate come from the Snowden leaks, and so I have gotten calls out of the blue from people and have been a little surprised by that.

Bumiller: Okay, sorry about the other question. I had a miss informant, I have to tell you. You touched on this a little bit in your remarks, but I would like for you to expand on it a little bit. To what extent, through all the revelations, the NSA revelations surprised you and to what extent they were what you suspected all along. I won't say that you knew all along because if you had known you would have written about it right?

Gorman: Yeah, I have found the revelations themselves to be really unsurprising. Like I've said I've been more surprised, or at least more intrigued in what has come out in the material that the government has put out. I mean the key things that Snowden put out, initially it was the phone program and what that did was bring some granularity to what had been known. I mean *USA Today* had a report in 2006 about the NSA sweeping up US phone records. So there was nothing new about that, but in seeing that court order to Verizon, specifying the types of things that Verizon was supposed to hand over to NSA and then some confusion ensued because reading that court order you think, obviously their providing locational information. I remember going back and forth with government folks for a week or two and they were absolutely adamant that they weren't collecting locational information. Having those documents out there has forced the government to be a little clearer about things and has certainly put information out there that we wouldn't have seen otherwise.

The Prism Program, I think there was a lot of confusing reporting around it in the beginning. It basically is NSA serving major internet companies with a court order where they have to provide large amounts of account information. But it does seem to fall under the general foreign spying authorities that the NSA has. So, well, I didn't know about that specific program I have known from speaking with people from Google for example that they had to create a sort of super structure to respond to these kinds of national security requests by the government, whether it be national security letters or other things. So it was not surprising to me that Google would be required to provide that kind of information. But what's interesting, I think, is if you take these revelations as a whole, all together, you start to see, the various ways the NSA was really building out its surveillance structure in the wake of 9/11. I think that people hadn't had, I certainly hadn't had, a full appreciation for how that was being built out, you know, combinations of tapping the US internet backbone, going straight to companies, collecting all of this metadata and trying to wrap it all together to get as complete a picture as possible, of really everything that is going on in the world.

Bumiller: Alright thanks. For Jill, I wanted to really—on your really interesting, fascinating comments about Russia—but I'd like you to talk about to what extent the cooperation on Syria would set the stage for a longer term US–Russian relationship, or if this is just a flash in the pan.

Dougherty: You know I think that is an excellent question. I mean I'm not quite sure I know. I think initially it would appear, yes they are working together and there is a lot of stuff on chemical weapons that Russia and the United States being the two countries that produced huge amounts of chemical weapons know a lot and over the years have worked together on, but that's kind of esoteric. I am not quite sure whether this can be translated. I get the feeling that some of it can on other issues, mainly because I think Russia wants to be perceived as cooperative, and when it wants to be perceived as cooperative it will do cooperative things. But I think that usually—like this theory that Vladimir Putin saved Obama's hide or something like that, yes maybe the effect was, but I do not think that Vladimir Putin set out to help Obama. So I think in all of these, it's what is in their interest that we have to watch. What does Russia get out of this? And right now, Russia's getting its act together. Restoring—I think the biggest point that I would make is that they are restoring the structures of soft power diplomacy that were very, very well funded and organized during the Soviet Union, fell apart at the end of the Soviet Union and now they are rebuilding them and they're putting a lot of money into them. And it is happening at the very time that the United States is being perceived as drawing back and not being as

aggressive and letting others do it. Again, whether you agree with that or not, but I think you have a confluence of those two tendencies at the same time.

Bumiller: That was the second question I wanted to ask you; you kind of lead right into it. My question was to have you talk, explain why this is happening now with Russia, and I think you just did and do you want to talk about it more. Is there a vacuum in the world because of the perception that the US is pulling back and also, could you talk about—is it a certain stage in Putin's leadership here, a point in his life, this is what is driving him? What are the forces driving him?

Dougherty: Well, let's start with the United States. I mean I do think that they perceive that the United States is weakened. They perceive that it is weakened economically, they look at the political chaos that we have here in Washington, the inability to get anything done, and they, perceive that the US is kind of, on its heels. In fact, I'll give you a great example, yesterday, I'm just scanning the Russian press and there is a proposal out there by some politician that you'll never hear of, who said that they want to ban the US dollar in Russia. Now, it's never going to happen, or maybe not in my lifetime but, why did this politician want to do that? Well, it's because the US economy is about to collapse. And there are a lot of people there who support this because they really do believe that the US economy is ready to collapse. Now, they don't really pay attention to Russia's economic problems—the inability to get investment. You know, young people—just go to Dupont circle and look for—say "Da!" in Dupont Circle and a lot of people will answer because there are a whole lot of young Russians here. And they're all in Silicon Valley. Tens of thousands of Russians are in Silicon Valley right now, smart ones. So anyway, I think that's the perception.

And then, also Russia is in search of itself. It's in search of who they are. As one person said, it's marketing; it's kind of like marketing, you know. Who are you? The United States knows who it is. France knows very well what it is. Russia doesn't know what it is. So, what they are trying to do is pull together a national idea. They haven't quite gotten it, but Putin is grabbing a little bit of the Soviet Union, a little bit of the tsars, a little bit of modern Russia, a little bit of democracy, and add salt and pepper and put it together and you're getting a national idea. I'm trying to be a little flip about it because it's a very serious issue you know. It's a very serious issue of who they are. So, growing Russia—feeling its oats—and a more quiescent United States or at least perceived as that.

Bumiller: So I'm now going to go through these questions, here is one for me that I am going to turn to Karen. This is: "Elisabeth, do you think Kerry still has hope for a presidential run?" I would say absolutely not.

DeYoung: And I would agree.

Bumiller: And Karen would agree. [*Laughter.*] I'm going to follow up the question with just—his relationship with Obama is really interesting because he has no ambitions, I think, beyond being Secretary of State, it has freed him, liberated him in a way, he never would have been liberated. I covered a bit of Kerry when I covering the White House in '04. I covered a bit of his presidential campaign and what's interesting to see is how, again, the freedom he's showing with what he's doing. If you could, just talk a bit about your sense of his relationship with the President and how much he pushes the President? They've given him free reign, as you said…

DeYoung: Well, I think the freedom aspect cuts both ways because, on the one hand, he does do a lot of the 'seat of the pants' kind of activity. On the other hand, it occasionally infuriates the White House and more than occasionally infuriates the State Department, which feels like—I think they were willing to give him some slack at first, but I think increasingly whether one agrees with it or considers the state-old Foreign Service that just can't do things on the fly, there's a part of that too. But I think that increasingly there's a feeling there that he's not consulting, people don't know what he's doing, he doesn't read the briefing papers he's given. All the complaints you often hear in the State Department,

but they're kind of louder about Kerry. And you can see it in evidence when you're with him. He—if you have, if you're lucky enough to be in his presence, he's very forthcoming. I mean, he'll say exactly what's going on, all off the record, and be very open about things, but does not have people around him who either know or feel free to talk about what's going on, which makes it very difficult for people like us that are, you know, riding in the back of the plane and might as well be in Des Moines for all the inside knowledge sometimes we have of things. I think that with the administration they were taken aback at first because when he jumped right into the peace process thing they were, "whoa, we didn't tell you to do that" and they kind of scrambled and said, "Ah yes, the President's trip in March, the President sent him out to do all that," but I don't think that was entirely true. I think he did take it on himself. I think Kerry was quite angry at Obama's shift in position on Syria after he had put himself pretty far out in front, Kerry, in arguing for the need for consequences for Assad's use of chemical weapons only to find within half a day that Obama had completely shifted and Kerry was forced to go out one day later, on the Sunday talk shows and defend that position when he had argued what arguably was exactly the opposite the day before. So I think again, as I said there, if any of this stuff works that Kerry is involved in they'll be really happy and they'll say it's them as all administrations do. If it doesn't work they'll say, "Eh, well we told you so now, right from the start, this guy was a problem." [*Laughter.*]

Bumiller: Yes, okay, well, thank you. Yes, well said. Siobhan, this is a question. Do you believe that US national security interests trump American values of democracy, human rights, and freedom at home and abroad? I mean, this is a question; it's a very good question. It's a question that a journalist hates to answer, but there you go. [*Laughter.*]

Gorman: There I go! As a journalist, I guess I don't "believe" anything in particular…

Bumiller: [*Laughter.*] Not officially!

Gorman: "Based on the reporting!" [*Laughter.*] You know, it's interesting when you come at these things from an intelligence perspective because as we've seen with NSA stuff, as we've seen probably to some degree in Syria, certainly as we saw with the drone program, you know, a lot of times the US will be speaking publicly in one fashion and privately either through intelligence or military means—usually intelligence because it's deniable—be carrying out a policy that is at the very least a lot more nuanced than what they are expressing publicly and sometimes can run counter to that and that's why the CIA has things like covert action; it's so that the US can do things that it thinks are in its national security interest that it doesn't have to own up to. And I think that we've seen a lot of that tension between promoting important values, human rights, freedoms, things like that, and national security interests. Particularly post-9/11, just because, you know, meeting US national security interests has certainly required alliances with countries where their leadership was not something that we were terribly fond of and often requiring us to take action—I mean the entire ramp up of the drone program obviously presents that challenge where you have folks in CIA's counter-terrorism center making life-or-death decisions about something that's happening literally on the other side of the world, and they weren't appointed by anybody than, obviously, the President. So, I think that we have definitely seen those tensions. We've seen them a lot post-Arab Spring as well and I think that in part, what you're starting to see is—the US seems to try to step back a little bit—is, I think increasing discomfort with feeling like, we're going to be intervening so much overseas in ways that may seem to be in conflict with the values that we are trying to present to the rest of the world and promote throughout the world. Obviously the Arab Spring has been a really mixed bag and we've seen, certainly, the promotion of freedom has had all kinds of consequences in terms of destabilization and turmoil. Certain sections of the world have obviously threatened regional security and to a certain degree the national security of the US.

Bumiller: Great. So Jill, here's a really good question about Putin. How long is Putin expected to have pre-eminent influence in Russia? And in his absence one day, who fills the leadership void and what impact will that have on the United States?

Dougherty: Well, he was just elected to, what is it, his third term. You figure, he became president, he served two terms, then he became prime minister, now he's back as president. It's a six-year term now, so he has what, five years left. Then he can run again, for six years. So all told, he could be in power for basically a quarter century—I think the exact number is 24.

Bumiller: How old is he? Remind us.

Dougherty: He is—let me think—63, maybe, I think he's about 63. So, he could be in power, easily, for another 11 years. Now, who knows what will happen and what the political situation will be. But right now, that is one of the problems—the second question is one of the problems—there's really nobody out there who can take his place, in a political sense. I mean the prime minister, the other part of, as they call it, 'The Tandem,' which is Mr. Medvedev, is mortally weakened politically. He's not considered a political force at all, so he's out of the running. And the opposition is constantly harassed, you know, alternately—Putin, in fact, just meet with the opposition but they are a desperate bunch and they're very good at in-fighting with themselves and there's really nobody that I see. I really believe it's going to be generational. I think that simply, the older people with gray hair, are going to have to die off and then maybe we'll get some of the younger people. But that may be idealistic. I think Russia, even some of the young people are very proud of Russia and want it to succeed so you could have a—it's never going to be the Cold War—but you could have a stronger Russia.

Bumiller: I've got five minutes, so I'm going to ask everybody one quick question. For Karen, to what extent will President Obama support Kerry's efforts on Israeli-Palestinian peace? Will the President expend political capital in order to press the parties to make an agreement?

DeYoung: I think they will support it to the extent it works and doesn't interfere with other priorities. I think the President will expend political capital when it's clear that the deed is done. He doesn't want to get involved in negotiations and doesn't want to be left holding the bag if it falls apart.

Bumiller: Great. I was going to ask all of you, but I'll ask Siobhan. What stories are we not covering and we, it's the collective we, you know American reporting on foreign policy and national security. What are we missing?

Gorman: Well, I think that one issue—it's not that it isn't being covered, but for so long, I mean years really, it was the dominant national security story—which is really Pakistan. I mean even right now we're talking about Afghanistan and obviously Pakistan is a huge factor in that. I mean Pakistan, the drone program; these were all things that were such a focal point of national security coverage. And you know, between everything we've discussed up here—Syria, Snowden, even Russia—are all kind of starting to take up so much oxygen that I really do wonder whether or not we really need to be focusing more on the 2014 prospects in Pakistan as well.

Bumiller: Pat just asked me to have both the other, Jill and Karen, respond to the same question as well.

Dougherty: I'll be really brief. I was just thinking I already named one, the Arctic. I think it's a huge subject; it's going to change the world. It's going to change how we deal with China and other countries. I would say energy, central Asia. Vladimir Putin believes that if you, follow the pipe lines, follow energy in a variety of ways and you'll kind of begin to understand the world. And I'm trying to do that. And then also I'd say demographics and youth. I think the issue of youth, the numbers of young people in the world, young people without jobs, is a huge story. And you see some things but I think it's under-covered.

Bumiller: Karen?

DeYoung: I spoke in passing about the Asia pivot, basically in a kind of derisory sense saying that it's not really happening, but in fact on the ground it is happening in terms of transfer of military assets. A lot of ships are going there, a lot of troops going there to that region and I don't think we really pay much attention to it. We tend to work in this sort of symbiotic relationship with the government, where if John Kerry's paying attention to it then we pay attention to it. If Obama is paying attention—and yet things are happening and basic—I don't want to say conflict—but the basic division between the United States and China is still there. And every time the President or the Secretary of State cancels a trip to Asia, which is the first thing they do when they run into a conflict that gets set back a little more. Again I think there are enormous military assets going there, there is an enormous amount of planning and I don't think we've really paid very much attention to it.

Bumiller: And I—Jill, one more question. Where does China fit into these foreign policy issues, especially when it comes to the current negotiations on Iran and Syria, China being a permanent member of the Security Council?

Dougherty: I would say, in a word, China doesn't do much right now. It kind of does what the Russians do at the UN. I don't think it quite understands it's as big as it is. So, in fact we were having this interesting conversation about the Philippines. The US is coming up with millions of dollars and the Chinese first came up with $100,000 to help out. So I think they don't quite understand if they had given a gazillion dollars it would have made waves, engendered a lot of soft power and you know, positive feeling. So, I think it's a huge subject, but I don't think they really quite get how important they could be. Not just economically. They get economically, but there are a whole lot of other ways.

Ellis: Well, as we come to the great place to end with that question. And as we come to the conclusion of this wonderful luncheon, I want to thank, first of all, all our guests for coming. I want to thank our wonderful moderator, Elisabeth Bumiller for great questions and taking time out of her busy schedule. I want to thank our three fantastic journalists for… [*Applause.*]

It's been not only a pleasure but also very interesting and informative. We could have gone on for hours. Needless to say, that's a good place to end. So in closing, I will ask everyone just to stay in their seats. I'm going to give you this certificate of appreciation. What it is—this is a certificate of appreciation to all our speakers for their leadership in news coverage of foreign affairs and also for serving as role models for the next generation.

So with that, we—you can hold them up—with that we conclude today's luncheon. Thank you all for coming and hope to see you soon and very happy holidays. [*Applause.*]