



**Beyond the Headlines**  
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**Lisa Anderson**  
President of The American University in Cairo

***Reform, Revolt and Revolution in Egypt and the Arab World***

**Ambassador Roman Kirn:** Allow me just to say a few words. I know that you are very anxious to listen to our main guest, Ms. Anderson, tonight on a very interesting topic. I would just like to welcome you here in our embassy. As you see, it's quite bright. This used to be the Yugoslavian embassy, some years ago. [*Laughter.*] And this was the embassy with the small windows, iron bars on the windows, on the rooftop, big internals, sending secret informations you know. [*Laughter.*] Because Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia, was a big player, you know that. We were a non-aligned country, together with Egypt, which is now in big troubles. But the point is that this embassy was so closed, so dark, one had the feeling that secrets are there to be kept you know, and no communication, no outreach to the world. Now you see this embassy has been completely redone. Big huge windows, a lot of light, no curtains, no iron bars, no internals. That does not mean so much that we are not hiding secrets. [*Laughter.*] Which is also true, because as diplomats we always hide secrets, believe me, but that means that our embassy reflects our new foreign policy, which means that it is an open foreign policy that is aiming for outreach, to communicate with the outside world. We have a different foreign policy agenda, and this is something that we are quite proud of, I must say. And I am glad that the Women's Foreign Policy Group decided to have—this is not the first event—to have one of the events in the embassy, I really commend your work because for what you do, it is extremely important for the standing of the events that we are witnessing today.

Let me just share with you one detail. 22 years exactly, 22 years, that was, what, 22 years? In the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I made a bet against somebody who said the Soviet Union will never disappear, will never disintegrate, even we didn't dare to bet that Yugoslavia would not disintegrate, that was just in the midst of the 1990s and look where we are today! It's huge, the changes are huge. So what can we expect? What one would dare to bet what will happen in the Arab world today? It is very, very hard to predict. But what is important for us is to have understanding of the development of the world because understanding of the development, that through nature, through causes of every political process is the main ingredients for the decision making process. And that is something, why I commend the Women's Foreign Policy Group for providing the floor for discussion of such topics which increases the standing of the counter-processes. And I have no doubt that Ms. Anderson will just address these topics from the insider and that is extremely important not only for the administration, the policy makers, but for the wider public, who can support for whatever measures may be taken. And as we know what are the developments now in the Arab World, in Cairo, there is a lot of suspicions, a lot of prejudices and we have to give away that. The only way to really do that is to open the floor to discuss that, to understand what's going on. Thank you very much and I wish you a good lecture and a good discussion later on. Thank you. [*Applause.*]

**Patricia Ellis:** Well good evening everyone and thank you all so much for joining us tonight for one of our Beyond the Headlines special events on Egypt. I want to begin by thanking the Ambassador so much for having us back again. It is a favorite venue, it's so beautiful and bright and we love coming here and as you mentioned, we have been here a few times before. And I have been to Slovenia, it is a beautiful country and I'm going back at the end of the summer to attend something called the Bled

Forum, which is a very exciting conference, and so I'm very glad to be going back. I'm Patricia Ellis. I'm president of the Women's Foreign Policy Group, for those of you who don't know me. We promote women's leadership, women's voices on the pressing international issues of the day. Egypt is certainly one of them. We are delighted to have Lisa Anderson with us tonight. We have been working on this for awhile. She's hard to get but thanks to Cynthia Anthony, one of our members who is the director of government relations for The American University of Cairo here in DC, we were able to arrange this.

So before I introduce Lisa, I just wanted to recognize a few people. One of our board members, Gail Kitch, the vice chair of our board. The Ambassador of Croatia. We have some of our colleagues from the State Department, other diplomats, and one of our corporate advisory council members, from Raytheon. So thank you all for joining us. I also just want to—even though it's the summer, the WFPG is going strong, so we just wanted to remind you of an event we have coming up next week and it's on North Korea. We cover all the hot spots, hard spots. This event is being hosted by the Embassy of Switzerland and the speaker is a woman who was the North Korea director until 2011 for the Swiss development agency and really has spent many, many years there and so it should be very interesting and we hope that you can join us. So we have a great turnout. It's a real tribute to our speaker and also shows the interest in the evolving situation in Egypt. Following the election of Mohamed Morsi—and of course, as recently as today, the parliament was convened based on his order, despite the fact that there was a ruling by the military and by the Supreme Constitutional Court that this was not legal and they had annulled the parliamentary elections, so we couldn't have a better guide to let us know what all these events are all about, for Egypt, for the region, for the United States and for Europe.

So Lisa Anderson—she's president of The American University in Cairo. Prior to that, she was the provost of the University, I first met her—she is a specialist in politics of the Middle East. And she was dean of SIPA, the School of International Public Affairs at Columbia. She was a professor of international relations, chair of political science department, chair of the Middle East Institute, and she taught at Harvard before that. And she has authored a number of books and I think I'm just going to mention one or two of them. One is *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Transitions to Democracy* and *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*. She got her MA at the Fletcher School, and her PhD. from Columbia. Please join me in welcoming Lisa Anderson.

**Lisa Anderson:** Thank you very much. It is a delight to be here. I'd like to thank the Ambassador for hosting us. As I regaled several of you, my mother's first trip outside the United States was to Yugoslavia and she fell in love with Slovenia and Croatia both so it's nice to be back. And also thank you of course to the Women's Foreign Policy Group and to Patricia Ellis. I think this turnout is actually a tribute to Mohamed Morsi, not to me. [*Laughter.*] But that's okay, I'll take what I can get. I have sort of a couple of ways to approach what is going on in Egypt, so I will tell you a story from my own experience and then I will revert to my political science self for a little while, and then I will come back to talking about how one might interpret current events in the country. And I will say a couple of things also about particularly Libya, where I was about two weeks ago. I am fundamentally optimistic about Egypt. I am fundamentally optimistic about changes that have taken place in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. I think the direction of change is essentially directions we would support and celebrate; even if there will be rough spots along the way. And I think that's inevitable, I think we will see that, in fact today may have been one of them. But I think we are seeing something that is a fundamentally positive set of developments in the region.

Let me tell you a story of essentially why I think that or one of the ways that I have come to think that. The president of The American University in Cairo has been provided bodyguards by the Minister of the Interior since the assassination of Malcolm Kerr in Beirut in the 1980s. Now of course that was Beirut, not Cairo, but be that as it may. So when I became president on the first of January 2011, I told the Ministry that I didn't want bodyguards because I didn't think they were necessary and I actually thought it was unseemly for a university president to have bodyguards. And there was a protracted negotiation which I essentially lost, and as a result on campus I have no bodyguards and in my home I have no bodyguards but if I am out and about in the city, one of these gentlemen—there are two of them and

they take turns—accompanies us. And part of the reason—and so he's in the car—so part of the reason why I was dismayed about this is of course my driver and I had talked politics for years before I became president of AUC and now we had state security sitting in the car with us. So for 25 days we said nothing in the car, whereupon the revolution broke up and we started talking politics again. So my driver and I, who had by then knew very well what we thought about various political things, toward the very end—well actually after Mubarak stepped down, my driver and I were talking about the then-prime minister Ahmed Shafik and his cabinet and what we thought of his various appointments and so forth. As we were arriving wherever we were going, he turned to this security guard who had said nothing through this entire conversation and asked him his opinion. And the security guard said “I don't have an opinion.” And my driver said to him: “this is a free country now, you have to have an opinion.” [Laughter.]

And that was the beginning, in my limited but nonetheless I think representative experience of the Egyptians figuring out how to have an opinion about public affairs. And this is what's been happening for the last 18 months, this is a revolution that was in many fundamental ways not only a revolution about rights, which it clearly was, but a revolution in which people demanded responsibility; that they were tired of being infantilized by a government that had said “you're not mature enough to understand.” So there was a demand for responsibility. And once people had accomplished that, that is to say, the revolution had actually ousted the president, they realized that they had these responsibilities, and one of these responsibilities is to actually have opinions about public affairs, which turns out not to be as easy as you might expect. So this security guard was quite genuine that he didn't have an opinion—he hadn't had opinions about public affairs, ever! So the same gentleman, about three weeks ago, and I are talking about the fact that the Supreme Constitutional Court had just disbanded the Parliament, which we're talking about just now. So I asked him his opinions about how things are going now. And by now he has opinions! [Laughter.] And his opinion was that for right now, it was the right decision. But that the situation in general wasn't very good and this was on the eve of the runoff between Morsi and Shafik and he was, it won't surprise you to learn, a Shafik supporter. So he was concerned about the elections and so forth and so on but generally he thought the decision to disband the parliament was a good idea. So I asked him, I said, you know, I thought half the people were happy about it and half weren't and he said no 60% were happy, and so forth and so we were estimating and in the last several months, was the first time there had ever been public opinion polling in newspapers and so forth. So this business about percentages of happy people actually meant something, or I didn't mean anything but we were trying to assess how you think about proportions of people who think various things.

And then he turned to me and he said “you know what? We need somebody who can make decisions around here. Egypt—Think of AUC (American University in Cairo) as a little country.” And I said “okay.” And he said “President Lisa makes decisions, right?” And I said yes. “And not everybody agrees with the decisions.” And I said “well that's a little cheeky! [Laughter.] But yes, it is true, not everyone agrees with the decisions.” But the decisions that President Lisa makes, and that form of address is a formal form of address for a person in my position so it wasn't cheeky to call me that. That was the appropriate way to address me. So he said “President Lisa makes decisions on behalf, for the good of the university” and I said yes. “Not for her friends and family.” And I said yes. And he said “so this is for, in the interest of the university.” And I said yes. And he said “well that's what we need in Egypt.” And he said “but the problem with us is we don't tolerate other people's opinions.” And I said “well, actually it's better than it was before, right? That is to say, trying to salvage something from the revolution, that is was better than it was before.” And he looked at me and he said “You know, that's right. Before we didn't have any opinions. Only the president had an opinion.” So in 18 months, he went from not having an opinion, to knowing that he hadn't had an opinion, and to having fairly well articulated opinions about public affairs. It's an anecdote—it's one person in 85 million people. But it is indicative of the kind of amazing journey that Egypt has gone through since the 25<sup>th</sup> of January last year. Now, how much of a change in the nature of politics does this actually make? These are stories and we can replicate stories but what is this going to mean for the character of politics in Egypt, or for that matter, in Tunisia and Libya.

I think political science can actually help us a little bit as well, so I'll go from my anecdote to thinking a little bit as a political scientist. And typically political scientists distinguish three layers or levels of political organization. And bear with me, I won't spend a long time on this part of the lecture. We think about governments, or as we say in the United States, administrations, that is to say the incumbents. So the Obama administration or the Mubarak government, that is to say the people there. We think about regimes, that is, the rules that produce incumbents. So democracy is a regime, you elect people to become president, and so forth. Monarchy is a regime: there is a mechanism by which the next king is selected. You can have military regimes, so a military career is a necessary requirement for being appointed president. Those are regimes. You can have different incumbents in the same regime. So Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad are essentially different incumbents in the same regime. Or, for that matter, George W. Bush and Barack Obama are different incumbents in the same regime. And then finally we think about states, and the states are the domains over which these regimes allocate responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, in essence. Okay. You can, therefore, think about change in each of these levels. So you can have a change in incumbents. In democracy, this is pretty ordinary. You go from George W. Bush to Barack Obama and periodically you have elections to decide who will be the next incumbent. It's obviously not a revolution. This can be pretty, conventionally can go by the rules in a sense in who succeeds the king, you go by the rules, who succeeds a president, you go by the rules, or you can have an unexpected change in incumbents, but it usually happens as a matter of course. I'll come back to this in a minute. You can have a change in regime, so the rules for how you select incumbents change. You have a democracy replacing a monarchy. That can seem fairly revolutionary, depending on how it happens. The revolutions, as they are often called, that ended monarchical rule in Libya and Egypt replaced both of them with regimes that were essentially military regimes, but they were monarchies before. And you can have a change in the state and the most obvious recent examples of that are the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. So the question is, what's going on in the Arab Spring? What are we talking about here? And I think if you look at Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, and I will just give a few of those examples and then obviously, there are other countries we could talk about.

Tunisia, which started this whole thing as you'll recall in December of 2010, changed the incumbents, that is to say President Ben Ali, with the intent of changing the regime. In other words, the military, which ultimately defected from supporting Ben Ali, knew that if he were to leave, the regime itself would change. And they were prepared for that and they backed away. And the reason for that is his was a police regime, not a military regime, they never got along, so the military was just as glad to see his back as to support him. So they were very happy when push comes to shove to say alright, you go, we, as the military have no investment in this regime at all. And so they could move from basically a police supported presidential system to what is increasingly appearing to be a genuinely democratic, however chaotic, in some ways, regime. The military is fine with this. They were never ruling before, they didn't rule under Borgiba, they don't expect to rule under the successor to Ben Ali. Okay. So there you see regime change.

In Egypt, which was next, you see a change in the incumbent, that is to say Mubarak left, engineered by the military, which I would argue expected that they could change the incumbent in order to save the regime. Okay? So that was a military regime, and the military thought that if they could move Mubarak out of the presidency, they would be able to save the capacity of the military to essentially rule. They sacrificed Mubarak to save themselves. Now of course they're in a real dilemma, because having done that, they then said to Mubarak: "okay you can go to Sharm el-Sheik and have a pleasant retirement there—you don't have to leave the country." Remember Ben Ali left the country, so Mubarak didn't have to leave the country, he could go to Sharm el-Sheik, but then ultimately, because he started saying things that they told him not to say, and partly because there was public pressure in the streets, they decided that they had to bring him to a court. Now what their worry is, having betrayed Mubarak, how can they assure that they are safe from any kind of subsequent judicial procedure? They can't. So they can't walk away completely without jeopardizing their status as the underlying regime. So you will see, and we can talk about that in some detail, a lot of contest over who is really running Egypt. Is it the

military regime that sacrificed Mubarak to stay in power, or is it a civilian president putting together a civilian government? And there is no consensus about that question in Egypt today. The people who voted for Morsi were voting for a civilian government and Ahmed Shafik was believed to be the presidential candidate of the military. He was the commander of the Air Force, he was clearly allied with them, so I'll return to this. But that's the tension in Egypt. It is really about the difference between the incumbent and the regime. In neither Tunisia nor Egypt was the integrity of the state in question. So at no point was there any issue about well, you know if Ben Ali leaves, Tunisia will fall apart. Or if Mubarak leaves or the military leaves, Egypt will fall apart.

In Libya, by contrast, the removal of Gaddafi was the departure of the incumbent, the collapse of the regime, and a threat of the state itself. And that's one of the reasons why Libya is more complicated in many ways than either of the two other countries. The three levels—incumbent, regime and state—were very tightly associated. I could go into far more detail about that than you ever want to hear. Keep in mind that I wrote this book that started in 1830. *[Laughter.]* So be careful, don't ask me about the history about this unless you really want to hear it. But the point is that these are really different dynamics. We tend to think Arab Spring, we tend to think you know, revolutions and so forth, but they're actually fundamentally different and they're going to have different dynamics in each country. And one of the trivial sort of indicators of this I think is what happened to the presidential palaces. So Egypt, the presidential palace is completely intact and you may have noticed—you probably didn't—but Morsi, on the day that he was inaugurated, went to visit the presidential palace and walked around and there were photo ops of Morsi being shown the presidential desk and the presidential this and so forth and so on. His wife went with him, it was very much a "this is the presidential palace." Nothing had happened to it. So the Mubaraks moved out and now the Morsis would move in. Now, in fact, the Morsis have decided not to move in, but that doesn't matter, the point is they could if they wanted to. In Tunisia, the presidential palaces were all looted, so there's nothing to move, there are buildings and so forth, but they weren't left for the next person. So clearly there was a regime change there, not simply an incumbent change. And in Libya, the Bab al-Alzizia compound, that is where Gaddafi lived, was razed to the ground. It is completely gone. There's not even buildings left there. So it is a way of saying, symbolically, the difference of scale and magnitude and depth of what's happened in these different countries.

What will happen in Libya? I think the fragility of the national identity is palpable and again we can talk about that, although the success of their ability to manage these elections is really quite heartening, I have to say. They should be congratulated on that and I think part of the reason for that actually is—this is a very unfair but nonetheless interesting kind of way of comparison, comparing what happened in these countries that's not about presidential palaces and gives Americans a sense of the scale of what's happened. The proportion of deaths that took place in the revolutions in Egypt, in each of these revolutions. So in Tunisia, about 340 people died, the equivalent, if you translate that in scale, to about 10,000 Americans. In Egypt, 850 people died, which is the equivalent to about 3,000 Americans, which is September 11<sup>th</sup>. So if you sort of think about the magnitude here. In Libya, about 30,000 people died, which is approximately a million and a half Americans. So it was devastating in Libya. And I think one of the reasons why Libya has actually been able to manage elections is that honestly, most people are just tired of fighting. It was a very, very, very difficult war. Lots and lots of people died. And they really, by and large, would rather not keep fighting, even though there are militias, even though, you know—one of the jokes I often tell about between living as I do in Cairo—and any of you who have been in Cairo know that there is not a stoplight in the whole city. *[Laughter.]* So I go off to Tripoli, and there are not only stoplights all over Tripoli—people stop at them! *[Laughter.]* So for all of this talk of anarchy in Libya, I mean, people want normal life! They want stoplights that people stop at! They want that kind of predictability and ordinariness. And they will actually put themselves out for that so, the capacity to have elections when people said "no, we're not going to shoot up the entire place" is partly a reflection of this desire for a kind of normality.

Anyway, to sum up—and then again, obviously I have lots of answers to questions. I think that the question in Egypt is how much regime change will actually take place. This is going to be contested,

this is going to take years to resolve, this is not something that is an easy question to resolve, so you will see it over the next year or so, but actually I think you'll see it for longer than that. To the United States, it will look a lot like Islam is a big issue, but actually that's not what the big issue is. The big issue is whether the military will concede space to civilian policymakers. In Tunisia, I think the stabilizing of the ruler of the regime—it needs institutionalizing democracy. And that's never really easy, but I think that's what the project is, which is a very different project than what's going on in Egypt. It's hard to build a bicycle while you're riding it, which is what the Tunisians are trying to do, but they all know what they want the bicycle to look like. It is supposed to be a democratic regime and I think they'll probably get there. And in Libya, I think the trauma of, depending on where you want to start the list, century, the last forty years, the revolution itself, will actually mean that people do want to kind of hang together because the alternative is more hanging separately, and they are very, very tired of that. So for different kinds of reasons, I'm actually quite optimistic about all three of those countries. We can talk about other, we can talk about Syria and so forth, but I know all of you came with questions and I'm perfectly happy to entertain them.

**Ms. Ellis:** Thank you so much Lisa. [*Applause.*] So, I am going to open it up with a few questions. Mine are all relating to Egypt, but I'm sure people will have other questions. And then I will try to get to as many questions as possible, so all that I ask is people, stand up, speak up, give your affiliation, and keep your questions brief. A few different areas—I will tell you what I'm going to ask about. One is the whole parliamentary situation, the struggle for power, the role of the relations with the US, Egypt's role in the region, and if we get to it, or someone else can ask about women, but I think since it is the Women's Foreign Policy Group, I think we do want to hear about what's on the horizon there. So in terms of parliament and this whole dance that is going on with the military, I'm just wondering what are the risks and the benefits for the new president, because clearly there are both and he's playing to different communities and of course, his party did have a majority in the parliament and this is a way to show his standing up to the military, but how far can he push it, and if you could address that. Thanks.

**Dr. Anderson:** I think there is going to be a lot of this sort of testing limits of his authority and the military are going to have to test the limits of their authority too. Because keep in mind, that Morsi's rollout of himself for the first couple of days was politically very adroit. The first thing he did, having been announced as the winner, was to go to Tahrir Square and to give a speech of kind of stem-winder in Tahrir square about the fact that in his view, his authority came from the people. He was democratically elected and you, in Tahrir square, are who made that possible, and so forth and so on. So it was very much an appeal to the revolutionaries and so forth, including many of the non-Muslim Brotherhood participants of the revolution. Then of course the next day he's sworn in by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which isn't what he wanted, but he agreed to do that, and then he went to Cairo University and gave a very sophisticated inaugural address about what his plans were, and so forth and so on. And then, he went to the major military base to be photographed sitting with Tantawi and everyone else in the Supreme Council, with 21 guns salute, and jets flying forth overhead and so forth and so on. So he hit every note as he was going through. And even the debate about parliament, so they opened parliament, the speaker of parliament who is a Brotherhood person, says: "the only reason we are here is because we have to acknowledge that we are being suspended." And they stopped. Okay. What's the point of that? The interesting thing is, somebody let them in the building. Because as soon as they had announced that parliament was suspended, the building itself was surrounded by the military. So somebody said okay, you guys are going to be allowed to go in there, and do something like that. So I think there's going to be a lot of this, you know, pushing forward a little bit, testing the waters. The interesting thing about this parliament maneuver, which I think was probably pretty clever on Morsi's part just to see how far he could go, was most of the other presidential candidates from the first round, said it was stupid. So now's he got a sense of who his allies in the civilians are and what their positions are. So he's testing waters all over the place. I think we can just anticipate that this sort of thing will happen and sometimes he will be seen as working with the military and sometimes he will be seen as working against the military. And that's exactly where he wants to be. He doesn't want to be seen as working with anybody right now, all the time. So I think that was the game that was taking place there and I think so far it's very interesting and everybody's playing a pretty agile part in it.

**Ms. Ellis:** Okay, well, just to segue: Today, Hillary Clinton asked that both sides—or all sides—should negotiate, so that is my segway into a question about the US. The Under Secretary Burns has been in Cairo, Hillary Clinton is going on July 14<sup>th</sup>, and you know that the US has had a very special relationship with Egypt and of course they would like to have a relationship with Egypt, and I think we'd all be interested in knowing how you see things evolving. I know there have been discussions about giving more of the aid that has been unspent and helping to restart the economy, I mean tourism is really flat and all these kinds of things. So what role do you see? Because this is also very delicate because of the close relationship with the Mubarak regime.

**Dr. Anderson:** Well one thing that everyone in Egypt and everyone in the administration in the United States acknowledges is—and it's important to do so—is that this revolution was not about the United States. It was about Egypt. And in that sense, I think the administration has done a reasonably effective job of not drawing attention to themselves, which is smart and appropriate. I think there has been some—there was during the height of the revolution and before Mubarak stepped down, of course some unhappiness with the lack of agility perhaps, of the administration, but honestly like most of the rest of the world they were caught flat footed—nobody expected this to happen. And I will acknowledge that after Ben Ali left Tunisia, as a practicing political scientist, I decided to test myself and I wrote down what I thought was going to happen in Egypt and I, like everyone else, was completely wrong. So there isn't any reason to think that Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama or anyone else would have been any smarter about it. And I think there's some understanding of that in Egypt, so there isn't that much of a sense that the United States should have been much smarter than they were during that period. There's been some frustration I think with the announcements of support for the revolution and then the failure to really deliver that but honestly, most Egyptians aren't paying much attention to the United States so I don't think that has a crucial—it's not an important factor within Egyptian politics. For us, I think it is an adjustment for the United States and a salutary one to start making policy not to an incumbent, but to a state. We deal with France no matter who the president is. We deal with, you know—and now we're going to have to deal with Egypt no matter who the president is. And I think that is, in the larger scheme of things, a good development. But, it takes some adjusting to. We were so accustomed, and this is honestly true of the whole region, American policy was always about the incumbent. We hated Gaddafi, we loved Mubarak, we didn't know about Assad—these are countries! Or at least, we could behave as if they were. And the fact that we didn't does suggest something about the lack of clear depth to the states themselves, but that's a different issue. The point is that for Tunisia and for Egypt, and probably for Libya, we're going to have to start making policy on the basis of—we always say it's national interest, if it's national interest, it's about the state, it doesn't matter who the government is. And we didn't operate that way and I think we will begin to operate that way and it's going to be an adjustment but it's a good one.

**Ms. Ellis:** Just before we open up to questions, the last thing I wanted to ask you is about Egypt's role in the region. I mean, it's such a large and important country—and now Egypt has the new government has connections with the opposition in Syria. One of the first calls they got was from Ahmadinejad congratulating them and inviting them to the summit of the Non-Aligned and all that, so how do you see their role evolving and what kind of role will they play?

**Dr. Anderson:** I think Morsi's government, and I think the SCAF [Supreme Court of Armed Forces] will, if you will, tolerate this, will probably be a little bit more interested in relations with states as opposed to incumbents, just as I was describing America. So Morsi is more likely to say—his government is more likely to say, well we have a relationship of some kind with this country, even if we don't like the government more than Mubarak did. Mubarak reciprocated that very personalistic—you know, in fact, Mubarak kept the Libya portfolio to himself, his foreign minister never did Libya. That was Mubarak-Gaddafi. And there was a lot of that kind of thing. So I think Morsi is going to try to normalize that to some extent and say, "you know what? Iran is here. We may not like their policies, but it's a country." I think he's clearly indicated sympathy with the opposition in Syria, but not to the extent that he's probably going to very much about it. He did very, very explicitly—and this was directed to the Saudis—

we are not exporting this revolution. This was one of the first things he said, very clear. So I think he's going to have a very Realpolitik policy from the perspective of Egypt. What are Egypt's interests? They are probably not going to be exporting revolutions and they are probably not going to be buddying up with particular individuals, so what's Egypt's interest in Palestine? A better, coordinated Palestinian government would be better for Egypt. Maintaining the Camp David agreements is better for Egypt. These are all about what's better for Egypt. And that's what I think you'll see and I think SCAF will be fine with that.

**Ms. Ellis:** Okay, let's open it up to questions. Do you mind if we take a few together? Okay. One, two, and three, right here.

**Question:** I'm Mary Ann Stein, one of my identities is I'm the founding chair of the Fund for Global Human Rights which supports human rights defenders and their organizations on the frontlines in the countries where the abuses are taking place. And I would be really interested in your view about the role of civil society going forward. And that connects me to a bit of confusion about what you were saying about dealing with the incumbents versus relating to a country. Where you have a dictatorship where there's no sense of responsibility to the pact, how on earth do you relate to a country as opposed to an incumbent?

**Question:** I'm Nancy Johnson. I'm with Baker Donelson in town. I served in Congress for a number of years. I'm interested in how serious you think Morsi is, because he's said a lot of very interesting things. This carries well with the preceding question. He made a lot of interesting statements the last six months or a year about how they all needed to be part of one country and Christians were okay and others who didn't agree with the Brotherhood were okay, so how serious, how much can we believe that he wants to see an Egypt that is multifaceted in its politics and religious beliefs? And in these three countries, is there any—should we be seeing Muslims as a threat to the development of democracy in all three countries or throughout the Middle East?

**Question:** Beverly Lindsay, Penn State University professor. Two short questions: one, to what extent will the new president be concerned with promoting particular social institutions, education, social welfare and the like. And secondly, to what extent might there be covert types of activities by the military that would undermine the president's power?

**Dr. Anderson:** Of course! [*Laughter.*] This is again, I think this is going to be a push and pull. There's a tug of war here. I think it's clear that the military realized from the very outset that they're better off, if you will, behind the curtain. SCAF didn't want to be the president. They want a president who can represent Egypt, who can worry about social welfare and so forth and so on. And they want to go back to the barracks. But they want to go back to the barracks with the privileges that they accumulated over the last 60 years. That's not that easy to do. So they're going to be contesting that, they don't want to be with all the responsibility, but they want all the privileges. Who wouldn't? So they're going to see how far they can go. And a lot of that will be contesting who's in charge here? What realm Morsi is going to, or any civilian government is going to be permitted? You know, he still hasn't announced his cabinet. One of the reasons he hasn't announced his cabinet is who's going to be the defense minister? Well, if I were him, I'd concede that—I'd say Tantawi, you can be the defense minister. I'm not going there right now. I want to make these other appointments. I want to make foreign minister, that's going to be mine. So I'm sure it's going to be that kind of thing. I think that's ordinary, I don't think that's—I mean, it will be fascinating to watch, but it's a fairly easily understandable dynamic of seeing people who are trying to keep as much as they can without having to actually admit it. I do think that you know, the constituency that supported Morsi and supported civilian government and actually supported the revolution, their principle concerns are very bread and butter concerns. They want jobs, they want you know, better education, you know, it's—that's what people care about in Egypt. Much of the issues of foreign policy are of no consequence to Egyptians. They want good schools for their kids. It's simple. They want kids to graduate from schools and get jobs. They want affordable housing. You know, things that everybody wants! And as they say, this is what everybody wants. This is what we want. So this is

what the civilian part of the government is going to have to devote itself to. It's a big project. So Morsi is going to be thinking about that. Now the interesting thing about the Brotherhood is for, since its beginning, it has always been friendly to the private sector. So it is going to be trying to encourage the private sector at the same time it's also trying to enhance education and provide various kinds of social welfare benefits and so forth and so on.

One of the other candidates, Hamdeen Sabahi, was a Nasserist. So he would not have encouraged the private sector and he would have tried to do big state enterprises and so forth and so on. So the Brotherhood is actually in an interesting, in my view, ideological position. On the one hand, populist enough to be concerned with the sort of social welfare issues, but also deeply and historically committed to private enterprise, capitalism, the market and so forth. So we'll see how these kinds of—there is obviously some tension in an Egyptian context there. We'll see how well he navigates though that. But that's what you would expect to see out of the Brotherhood's ideological baggage on those sorts of issues. Are the Brothers or any other Muslim movements a threat to the development to democracy? At this point, I think the answer is no. I think the Muslim parties in Tunisia and Egypt particularly are quite comfortably domesticating themselves as democratic political parties. I think 25 years ago that wasn't the case but many of us have matured in the last 25 years, not least of whom many of these movements. And I think you are going to be seeing—and this is part of also what you'll be seeing is, if you look at Europe you see Christian Democrats and you see Christian Socialists. And they all evoke a history of the importance of the church and the importance of theology and justifying what they're doing and so forth. Well you will see Muslim Democrats and Muslim Socialists. You will see the kind of conservative Islam and you will see a socialist Islam. There will be a tension in the Brotherhood there and in the Muslim political parties and so forth. But they will become political parties, in my view, and part of what's interesting about this and this gets back to the question “can you trust what they say?” And Morsi's been saying this stuff all this time. What makes me think they will be any Muslim base, whether it's the Anachid Party in Tunisia or the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, why do we have any reason to believe what they say? Well the interesting thing about this is, I think there is evidence that most of the mainstream Muslim groups have actually abandoned violence deliberately. This is a choice that they've made, they just don't think it worked, it didn't work, so they're going to try something else.

But the other thing is that I think is interesting and amusing and anyone who's ever run for office knows this, you make a lot of promises you don't know whether you can keep. This is politics. The interesting thing is that all of these political parties, particularly growing out of the Muslim Brotherhood, have never been held to account for their promises. And the wonderful thing about knowing that you'll never win is that you can promise anything! [*Laughter.*] Well now, they're winning! So suddenly, they're going to have to moderate their promises, they're going to have to start thinking politically, so I think one of the things you're going to see is this very interesting and very rapid development of a rhetoric of campaign promises that are much closer to something that you can actually be tested on. There's not point to be running on a campaign that “Islam is the solution” if in a couple of years you're going to have to run for reelection. So you're going to have to say “My party will collect the garbage. My party will improve education. My party will do whatever I'm going to promise it can do” and then you have a prayer of being able to reelected on the basis of having done something. So I think that's really quite an important dynamic. And Morsi got support from many people who did not support the ideological rhetoric of the Brotherhood. And now he's going to have to go back and figure out how to keep them, among his constituents. So I think there is a longstanding anxiety about the Brotherhood in Egypt, on the part of Christians for example, but, faced with voting for a military candidate, that was Ahmed Shafik and voting for a civilian candidate, even if he came out of the Brotherhood, there were people who said I'm voting for the civilian. And Morsi knows that. He knows that those are part of his putative constituency and his party will never do well if he ends up losing those votes. So, the jury is still out. We won't know until we see what his cabinet looks like, we won't know until we see a new parliament, all that sort of stuff. There's plenty of opportunity to make mistakes between here and whenever he'll be tested on this. But I do think judging from the kind of people that I know he's been talking to for cabinet positions and so forth and so on, he wants to come out as a national unity government. Now whether

he's going to be able to accomplish that and whether that kind of government is going to be able to make policy that bears any kind of fruit in whatever will be the electoral cycle is a different question, but I think he's quite committed to that. And whether it works or not is part of what we'll have the opportunity to watch.

As far as civil society—I mean I think again, that depends country to country. I don't think there's a civil society in Libya, at all. And that's really what I would describe as a civil society. You have to have a state to have a civil society in my view. You have to have a government, you have to have law and order, you have to have a set of things so that you can actually have groups that are representing interests within society. I don't think you have that in Libya. I don't think tribes constitute civil society. I think you have a lot of that. Most Libyans took refuge from their own government in their families because there was nothing else. [*Inaudible.*] By contrast, I think there are, football clubs, there are all sorts of social groups and so forth and so on in Egypt that constitute part of civil society. Relatively apolitical, but they're not my family, they're groups I belong to, there are alumni groups, there are other, that kind of thing. So in that sense, civil society in both Tunisia and Egypt is relatively robust. It doesn't exist at all in Libya. And I think it will increasingly become more robust and more differentiated and people will have choices about what kinds of things they want to belong to and what kinds of newspapers they want to read and what kinds of, who they follow on Twitter and all that sort of stuff. And it will become more differentiated, and more complex. And much of that is perfectly ordinary. In fact, I think the most important thing that could happen in Egypt, tomorrow would be the development in PTAs. I want everyone to be involved in Parent Teacher Associations. It would be the best thing for schools. So there are all sorts of things you can imagine happening in Egypt that would be part of civil society, the growth of that sort of apolitical citizenship. I also think, of course, there are very important advocacy groups within civil society, human rights groups and so forth and so on, who will drive the government crazy, but that's their role, that's what they're supposed to do, and there will be space for that. The question is whether there will be space for American-funded civil society groups. Maybe not for a while. But I don't—I mean frankly, that's such a small part of Egyptian society and Egyptian civil society that it doesn't—that's not that much of a concern to me. My concern is that the Egyptian organization for personal rights continues to be able to operate and it has been operating, quite effectively so, and I think that it will continue to be able to do so.

**Question:** Shelly Porges, director of the Global Entrepreneurship Program at the State Department. I feel compelled, I was going to ask another question, but I feel compelled to come back to the subject of women's voices and how they will be included going forward. What do you see?

**Question:** I'm Helena Cobban. I have a publishing company called Just World Books. Lisa, I would like to probe a little bit more your views on the American role in supporting the military. We have a problem in this country of a bloated military that, you know, actually has a disproportionate amount of weight in the determination of foreign affairs, and Egypt has had the same and they are, in a sense, synergistic, and Egypt's problem is, to a large extent, something that our policy has created and certainly sustained, so it's not just a question of diverting aid from US aid from the military to non-military, it's also a question of trying to position—I mean how would—what would you advise the president, our president, and Secretary Clinton to do in terms of trying to give the Egyptian forces—and I don't mean the armed forces, I mean the forces in Egyptian society—the optimal space to renegotiate that compact between the military and the civilians? Which is what, I'm going ahead right now, but we're not neutral in that and we can throw our weight one way or the other.

**Question:** My name is Shahin Mafi. I'm a business woman. I wanted to know what kind of similarities you see between the Iranian Revolution and Egyptian Revolution. Since Morsi is a member of Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin, this is called Muslim Brotherhood, and Khomeini was the member of the Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin.

**Dr. Anderson:** Okay. On women. One of the things that I think is a real conundrum on the question of women in these sorts of transitions is that you had a state-supported women's empowerment, which

was not a reflection of a societal sense of where women should be and what they should be doing. So in Egypt, you had a quota system for a certain number of women in parliament. You had Suzanne Mubarak as the patroness of all sorts of things, including the National Council for Women. You had Suzanne Mubarak forbidding her daughters-in-law from wearing a head scarf. You had a whole sense of, this is how women should behave. And women had certain kinds of access to things and so forth that as soon as Suzanne Mubarak is removed, collapsed completely. So the National Council for Women, which was entirely a Suzanne Mubarak fan club, disbands. The quota for women in parliament is finished. So naturally, some women's rights advocates are very anxious about this. Sort of, who is going to be the champion of women, if not the first lady? And Mrs. Morsi has quite explicitly said that's not her role in life. So the interesting dilemma is, without the first lady being the engine of this, what should women's rights advocates do? And where should they get their leverage? And so forth. And the answer is not clear. So right now, it is fairly murky. But it's worth observing that the women's access to positions of public authority also declined with the collapse of communism. That there is a very interesting—as states shrink, that women, if you look in general—that women have more access to positions of public authority when you have large states. Large, public sectors. That it comes out of public policy. And when public policy changes or the state shrinks and the market becomes more important, the status of women tends to decline—and this happened in Eastern Europe in the former Soviet Union. And the likelihood that in these state socialist, formerly state socialist kinds of places like Tunisia and Egypt, the same thing is going to happen. And part of the reason is this general dynamic that it is public policy affirmative action, in essence, that creates opportunities for women. It doesn't happen in the private sector in the same way.

So that's also—it's partly, without Mrs. Mubarak—what do we do now? But it's also partly that these kinds of transitions create real challenges for women. And I think that's sort of where we are. That means that the women's advocates in Egypt have to have a very different strategy and a very different approach and they have to pick different battles than they did, because you know it used to be, if you got Mrs. Mubarak's ear, you were done. That's all you had to do. Well, that wasn't such a smart strategy in the long run anyway, but it certainly isn't going to work. So I think it's an interesting moment. And I do understand that for a lot of the women's rights advocates of the past, the combination of not knowing whose ear you need and the Muslim Brotherhood taking the presidency and the parliament is pretty disconcerting. But again, I think that's, the issues really are, where are you going to get your leverage? What are the battles that are important to you? How are you—and keep in mind, as with almost every country in the world now, but certainly in the Arab world, women are—there are more women in university and college level education than there are men. So there's going to be a kind of pressure into the job market over the course of time. If it were me, I would be saying I want to make sure that those young women get jobs. Because it's going to be about the private sector. So are the business incubators looking for young women with good ideas? That's where there's interesting and important space there. But it's not going to be about a quota in parliament. So people really have to change the way they worry about these issues.

On the role of the US supporting the Egyptian military, I do agree that part of the problem is the US's own sense of the appropriate role of the military is a complex one that doesn't necessarily mean that we have solutions that we can offer from our own experiences. Our own military industrial complex has become so powerful in the engine of the American economy that it's hard to say to another military: "stop being an engine in your own economy." That's what we do, why shouldn't the Egyptians do it that way? And it is true, in a recession in the United States, the fact that the military provides, and military related industries provide employment, is important. It's one of the sources of leverage they have. It's one of the reasons why we keep trying to export stuff, military equipment, because it's one of the things that we manufacture, which is one of the reasons why we have jobs. It's a complicated problem in the United States, so there's not a lot of reason to think that we are going to be very good at helping the Egyptians get out of chicken farming. But it is true that the Egyptian military runs huge chicken farms and bottled water and all sorts of things that are not central to the mission of the military. But how the American military is going to be able to advise them is not at all clear because the American military may not be doing chicken farming but it's, it does a lot of things that matter a lot to the economy of

many congressional districts. So I think that this is going to be a real challenge and I don't know that we're as thoughtful and sophisticated about that as we might be. On the Iranian Revolution, one of the things that's really interesting about all the revolutions, that is the three that I was talking about, is that they all say we're not going to be the Iranian revolution. From the word go, for better or for worse, the Iranian revolution is an example of what nobody wants to do. So it is a case of this very interesting historical learning. People keep saying, what is Egypt a case of? What is Tunisia a case of? And I just try to say, you know, change in regime or change in incumbents is a kind of way about thinking about what case this is. But from the outset, there was a "well we might look like Turkey, but we don't want to look like Iran. We don't want to look like Algeria, look what happened in Algeria when the president of the parliament—there were too many Muslims and the military stepped in and we don't want that, and we're pretty sure that our military won't make that mistake. So there is a real learning from history. We don't want to do Algeria, and it's pretty clear that the militaries in these countries concluded, whether they could or not. I think the Egyptian military is the only one that could have acted like the Algerian military and they elected not to do that. But they're still pushing and shoving around the parliament. So you could go the Algerian route, but I don't think that will happen. Similarly there is a real sense that: "no, we don't want to go the Iranian route" so lessons learned there—how do we ensure that that doesn't happen? They'll make their own mistakes. That's what's going to happen. They aren't look like Iran, they'll look like Egypt. And everyone may look back and say "boy that was a big mistake" but it certainly is going to be a different mistake. And it is going to be a different mistake in part because people are very self conscious about making other people's mistakes again.

**Ms. Ellis:** So, on that note, Lisa thank you so much, this was so fantastic. *[Applause.]* We are so lucky to have you and I know we all learned a lot. Please stay, we have a reception right now and the bar is open. Thanks again.