



**Beyond the Headlines
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Egypt: How a Virtual Revolution Became Actual

Maxine Isaacs: Good evening everyone and welcome. Thank you very much for being here tonight and joining us for this Beyond the Headlines event with Michele Dunne, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate and Editor of the *Arab Reform Bulletin*. She is going to speak this evening about the Egyptian revolution, how it developed and evolved, the current political situation in Egypt, and its impact on the region. I can't imagine a better time or place to be hearing from Michele about these very important subjects. I am Maxine Isaacs, Chair of the Women's Foreign Policy Group [Board] which promotes women's leadership and voices on pressing international issues of the day. On behalf of the Women's Foreign Policy Group and its Board Members who are here tonight, including Isabel Jasinowski, Susan Rappaport, and our president, Patricia Ellis, from whom you'll hear from shortly. We are very pleased that you could be with us on this important evening.

The event tonight is part of our Beyond the Headlines Series, along with our Embassy Series, are two of our most popular programs at the Women's Foreign Policy Group. We work very closely with the diplomatic community, especially women ambassadors and diplomats. We are very pleased to see all of you here tonight. Thank you very much for being here.

This has been a very special year for the Women's Foreign Policy Group. It is our 15th anniversary. We launched the year with our event at the Singaporean Embassy, followed by a Behind the Headlines event, just before the State of the Union, with Karen DeYoung of *The Washington Post* and David Sanger of *The New York Times*. We have many exciting programs coming up and we hope that you will be part of all of that. We will be sponsoring our annual International Women's Day Luncheon on March 8th and we have an Author's Series event on March 17th, and we hope to see you there. Now it's my great pleasure to introduce you to the Women's Foreign Policy Group President, Patricia Ellis, who will introduce our speaker and moderate the program this evening. Thank you very much. [Applause.]

Patricia Ellis: Thank you Maxine. Good evening once again and welcome. We are so pleased to see such a great turn out. The topic could not be more timely and we have a wonderful speaker tonight. Thank you all so much for coming. We are pleased to have Michele Dunne. She is a true expert on Egypt and democracy in the region. She is going to discuss Egypt, how a virtual revolution became an actual one, help us understand better the revolution in Egypt, the challenges Egypt is facing, and the impact Egypt has had on so many other countries in the region. As I said, it couldn't be more timely with protests and violence in Libya, and different reactions in the region, it all happened so very quickly. As Maxine mentioned, Michele is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment and editor of the online *Arab Reform Bulletin*. She has had a very impressive career that has spanned the State Department and the White House. She was on the NSC staff. She was on the Policy Planning staff. She worked in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She served at the US Embassy in Cairo, the US Consulate in Jerusalem. It is no wonder she has been a commentator on the protests in Egypt and everything that has been going on in the region. We are just so lucky to have her here. She also is the author of many publications on democracy in the Middle East and I commend you to her website where you can see the full list of them. Please join me in welcoming Michele Dunne. [Applause.]

Michele Dunne: Thank you, Pat. Thank you, Maxine. Thanks to the Group for inviting me. I'm really delighted to be here tonight. What I'm really interested in is having a discussion with you. But I'm going to start things off with about a quarter hour worth of remarks. Little did I think when Pat asked me to speak that by the time I got here Egypt would look like old news—a calm situation nothing much going on compared to the rest of the region. That was just ten days after President Mubarak stepped down.

A few general remarks about what is going on in the region and then I'll move into Egypt in a little bit more detail because there really are some striking common threads in the region. There are these socioeconomic phenomena like a youth bulge throughout the region, this demographic phenomenon about an unusually large proportion of people are about the ages of 15 to 25. People looking at the region have seen this coming and are wondering exactly how it would affect the region. Youth bulges are associated with civil wars and instability in other parts of the world. It's really been interesting to watch something that was discussed in academic articles to burst onto the news pages with young people leading these uprisings in various countries. The youth bulge is also accompanied by the change in the information environment and the way these young people are growing up with access to satellite television and the internet. They're growing up knowing a lot more about the world even if they haven't traveled outside their own countries.

Another one of the common threads in the region politically is that most of the Arab countries—it's hard to make one size fit all—in most of the Arab countries we have a situation where political authority is concentrated in the hands of one person, whether it is a president or a monarch, who is not really elected and not accountable via the ballot box. Although there are legislative bodies in most of these Arab countries, most of them don't have much power. There are a couple exceptions. For the most part the power is in the hands of the president and executive branches, with little power in the legislative bodies. Another thing is that we have seen leaders stay in power for not years, but decades in many cases. It's very striking to me that in the exact countries where we have seen trouble in the last month are those places where people have tried to cling to power through legal and extralegal means. President Ben Ali in Tunisia, President Mubarak in Egypt, President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. In Bahrain it's the prime minister—the king has only been around for a little more than ten years, the prime minister has been in office since the late 1970s. Of course Qaddafi, the longest ruling head of state. There was in this region—those of us who watch internal politics in Arab countries could clearly feel this—a lot of pent-up demand for change. I think the thing that none of us quite predicted was the Tunisian uprising. I think this wasn't the place necessarily where a lot of who watch the region thought there would first be change. But clearly what happened in Tunisia showed others in the region that a lot of these regimes in the region were more brittle or more vulnerable than people expected. There's something that happened, a barrier of fear that people had about people taking over their governments was broken. Clearly, we see the ripple effects of this. And also there are significant differences—even in the countries that were in significant trouble last month—I think we see that painfully with Libya right now. Libya is quite different from Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain for example. For one thing, Libya is much more isolated than those countries. There's been more contact with the outside world in Libya than there was the decade or so before, but it's still significantly less. If you visit Libya I think you feel the isolation there. You have a Libyan government in place that cares much less for its international affairs and relationships than governments in some of the other Arab countries. The militaries are not at the same level of cohesion in all these countries. The Tunisian and Egyptian militaries were quite cohesive. We saw in both of those cases that when the military had to make a decision to restore stability to the country or remain loyal to a specific leader, they chose the former. But in Libya it's not clear that the military will be acting cohesively because Qaddafi has created a very patchwork military and security apparatus; we don't see a collectivized army.

Let me turn to Egypt for a minute. I'm sorry but it goes without saying that this is why I think we see a great deal more violence in Libya. We see the Libyan leadership using violence and terrorizing its own population with heavy weapons. We are seeing defections from the Libyan military because of this. It is clearly not acceptable to everyone who has been part of the Libyan regime. I want to talk a little bit

about the background to the revolution in Egypt because it looks as though the Egyptians responded rather quickly—the Tunisian uprising went on from mid-December to mid-January and then very quickly after that—within ten days—we saw the first big Egyptian demonstration on January 25th and things escalated very quickly. However the groundwork for this was laid years before. One way to look at it—I'd trace it back a decade. We saw growing protests in Egypt for a decade. I would trace them back initially to protests by Egyptians in support of the Second Palestinian Uprising that began in late 2000 and protests against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both of these cases we saw fairly large protests that were organized on foreign policy issues. That was alright with the Egyptian Government. People were allowed to protest about those kinds of things. But in both of those cases the protests began to turn critical of the Egyptian Government and President Mubarak, which was a little unusual—unusual for that to happen in Egypt. Some of the same people involved in organizing those protests then later on in 2004 formed this Egyptian Association for Change, which became known by its slogan Kefaya, meaning enough. This was a different movement in Egypt, it was non-ideological. It brought people together from across the ideological spectrum: Liberals, Leftists, Nasarists, Islamists, coming together specifically to call for President Mubarak not to serve another term at that time. He was up for election to serve another term in 2005 and for his son not to succeed him. Kefaya was a really important movement—even though it wasn't very successful and the protests they held were small—they broke some taboos about specifically protesting the rule of Mubarak.

There were parliamentary elections in 2005. Those elections were somewhat freer than elections that Egypt has held before. The Muslim Brotherhood won about 20% of the seats in the parliament. That brought down a big government crackdown against the Brotherhood and against others as well. Also a lot of the promises that President Mubarak and the ruling party made in the electoral campaigns in 2005, they later went back on. Mubarak had promised to lift the state of emergency that the country had been under and he also promised to carry out constitutional reforms; but he did carry them out in 2007. I think the evaluation in the end is that they took away more political liberties than they added. What we saw from 2006 onward was a growing disenchantment with formal politics in Egypt. We sense from the opposition that trying to form political parties to support and participate in the next election was not going to work and wasn't going to bring about any change in Egypt. There were other kinds of protest movements, notably labor protests, some very large labor protests. These were in reaction to economic reform programs, neoliberal economic reform programs that the Egyptian government had been trying since 2004 onward, particularly the privatization of state industries that caused dislocation for state workers. So we saw in April 2008, an effort by young activists who were primarily interested in political change in Egypt. They mounted an effort to try to link up with the labor activists and they managed to carry out a general strike on April 6, 2008. They formed what you might have heard of as the April 6th Movement that was organized on Facebook. This is the first time that Facebook was used in a big way to carry out a protest. There was a harsh crackdown after that and they weren't able to carry forward and do much more than that for several years.

Now in last year, 2010, former head Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency returned to Egypt and started talking about the need for freedom and democracy. He set up something called the National Association for Change and he put out this seven point program for liberal political change. He got a surprisingly large number of signatures on this petition, with the help of other political groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, and most of this was done online. They had an online sign-up campaigns for people to support this program. In June of last year there was an incident in Alexandria. The police beat to death a man named Khaled Said and this became a cause *célèbre* in Egypt. Another Facebook group was set up called "We are all Khaled Said." The reason for this is that police brutality is a major human rights issue. It is something that any Egyptian can potentially face; it's not an abstract issue. So police brutality and torture became one of the rallying points and they held a large demonstration in Alexandria protesting this death and calling for investigations. As 2010 went, I think there was a growing sense that the Egyptian regime might be vulnerable. President Mubarak was getting old: he was 82 going on 83, he had to travel to Germany for gall bladder surgery—although there were certainly suspicions that there was something more profound going on with his health. Discussions and disagreements within the ruling elite about the line of succession, who should come

after Mubarak, began to break down in the public. I think it increased the feeling in the Egyptian public in general that maybe the regime was a bit vulnerable, that it wasn't the kind of solid front that it had once been. In November of last year, Egypt once again held parliamentary elections. These, in contrast to 2005, were significantly more corrupt elections. The ruling party took virtually all seats in the parliament, pretty much closed down the opposition all together. Egyptians, I think at that point were really disgusted with the situation, really disgusted with the performance of the government. What I mean to say is at that point by December 2010, after these elections were over, the tinder was very, very dry in Egypt and then we saw a spark leap from Tunisia, just a few weeks later.

What happened in January after the Tunisian uprisings were two things you have to watch—that Egypt was looking—for happened very quickly. One of them was that the various grievances that had been expressed through all these different and unconnected protests—protests about economics, rise in prices, labor protests, protests about poor government performance on all kinds of various issues, human rights protests, explicitly protests about maintaining democracy and so forth—became connected. That's something that some of the organizers have been trying to do for a long time and were unable to do; but it suddenly happened in January of this year. The other thing that happened was all this virtual activism, all this organizing, these Facebook sites, these YouTube videos, all this stuff had been going on, suddenly became actual. I remember my research assistant, who is here, and I were watching this protest only declared a week before January 25th and watching the Facebook groups that were organizing this protests said, "hmm, you know impressive numbers on these Facebook groups. I wonder what this protest is going to be like." And then hearing that the protesters were going to be going out into communities, going door to door organizing to get people to turn out and protest. What happened was very quickly these protesting Egyptians went from having a few hundred people, at the most a few thousand people at a protest to tens of thousands on January 25th, and then we saw hundreds of thousands after that. These things happen very, very quickly. I think that pretty much what happened in Egypt between January 25th and February 11th when President Mubarak stepped down.

A very quick look at the current political situation in Egypt, there's a Supreme Council of the Military that is in control, basically taking the place of the Egyptian presidency, which is vacant. Both of the houses of parliament have been dissolved. There is a constitutional committee running some limited amendments to the constitution to allow for free and fair presidential elections, which the Military Council has promised, and also parliamentary elections. I haven't seen a specific time table on this. My sense is that the Military Council wants to hold presidential election within six months and parliamentary elections—which will be a bit more complicated— might come later than that. A lot of the main figures of the regime, including President Mubarak, some of the ministers, some of the senior advisors in the ruling party have their assets frozen, some of them are under arrest, and many of them are facing possible prosecution. There's an expectation that political groups are going to be able form political parties in a much freer atmosphere than they have been able to in the past, although the laws regarding that have not yet been changed. Just today, just this afternoon, they announced a new cabinet in Egypt, although I think it's a very limited cabinet change, they've brought in a couple people from the opposition into the cabinet. But they also left some widely disliked figures, such as the Justice Minister, in this cabinet. I'm not sure whether this cabinet will hold or whether they will have to make further appointments. Now there are some unsatisfied demands of the protesters. The protesters had three main demands: one was Mubarak goes, both houses of parliament get dissolved, and the emergency law gets lifted—that one has not been lifted yet, I think the military is using that as a bit of a bargaining chip. They wanted the demonstrators out of the street. They wanted people back to work. That is beginning to happen. I think this does trigger—I think the movements behind the demonstrations are loathed—they're not going to give that up totally—say, we can be back in the streets at anytime that we're not happy with what's going on.

A couple of areas that I think are of particular concern. One of them is the economy. The Egyptian economy suffered significant losses during this uprising. I think it's going to be challenging to get it going again. Furthermore, I don't know what the philosophy will be going forward; I know the economic

reform policy that has been in place since 2004 has now been discredited. Those were some of the people President Mubarak first fired to try to assuage—to try to get the demonstrators out of the streets unsuccessfully. Unfortunately the kind of structural economic reforms that Egypt has carried out—I think they were the right thing to do to attract investment—increasingly open up the economy. They're also accompanied by a lot of corruption and a lot of unfair distribution of the benefits of reform. So now the whole idea of this reform is tainted in people's eyes. We can talk a little about the economy a little more if you're interested.

Another concern I have is the role of the internal security services. They are massive inside of Egypt, three and four times the size of the army. They have been very, very involved in a negative way in the lives of Egyptians; they've been very intrusive in politics. As I mentioned there's been widespread brutality and torture. To me if that doesn't change, then nothing changes. That's going to be a key thing and we're just beginning to see some discussions about that: but we haven't seen any significant steps. For example, the old interior minister was replaced, but he was replaced by someone else from the same apparatus, not really someone that would symbolize a new era in terms of how the police and internal security services are going to deal with the population.

Just three quick lessons that I would like to leave you with, lessons learned for me out of this. One of them is that for Egypt, economic reform ran out of time because of the lack of political reform. So the whole idea of promoting economic reform and in time political reform would come, didn't work here. They did carry out some economic reforms; I mentioned were accompanied by corruption. Also I think the benefits of those economic reforms, despite corruption would trickle down over time, but they ran out of time because people were so unhappy with the political and human rights situation. Another one is although Islamism is a current of opposition in Egypt and elsewhere. The Muslim Brotherhood is a very important organization in Egypt; I expected to play a significant role in Egyptian politics going forward. It is really striking how non-ideological these uprisings have been and how Islamists have not been in the fore. And before, ten years ago, to me, in opposition in the Arab world meant to be an Islamist. That is not the case anymore. There are these new opposition currents that are more liberal, that are coexisting, side by side with the Islamists. We can talk about that dynamic if you're interested in it. The last thing is that I've really been struck with how Egypt does remain a leader in this region, even though the Egyptian State has not been a leader for a long time. Egyptian society and what we've seen the Egyptians doing, not only over the last few weeks, but over the last few years, I think the currents in the Egyptian opposition, I have seen them watched and imitated elsewhere in the Arab world. I think that Egypt, especially if it manages to make a successful transition to a democratic government, really stands to recapture some of its lost leadership role in the Arab world. *[Applause.]*

Ms. Ellis: We will go to the Q&A and I will open it. But we do have a microphone, if you could please wait for it and stand up and please identify yourself. Keep your questions brief, and then we can get to as many questions—I'm sure there are a lot of questions.

So I would like to pick up near where you ended with the mention of the new cabinet that was appointed today. All eyes are on Egypt. The expectations are very high and I'm just wondering what this new cabinet, which kept the defense, foreign minister, et cetera, says about the changes that the army is willing to make during their transition. And is anything going to satisfy the youth—I mean the Muslim Brotherhood and some of the youth activists coming out already in opposition saying this is too little, and so there is talk about having more protests. So I am just wondering if you could discuss that a little more.

Ms. Dunne: My sense is that this is not the kind of cabinet that people were looking for in Egypt. They did bring in a couple people from—a couple of respected figures from civil society and older opposition parties—the Wafd Party, the Leftist party—but, as I mentioned, left in place a number of people who are going to be problematic. Now the defense minister, I don't think anybody was going to expect that he was going to be changed, so that's not a problem. But I do think the justice minister is problematic. There has been a lot of unhappiness with that justice minister—I think the interior minister. These are

some of the portfolios where they really should have change. There are a couple of problems here. One problem is the cabinet might have a limited willingness on behalf of the Military Council to really change. The other thing—I do think I heard echoes of this—they had a hard time getting people to join this cabinet, that they offered portfolios to a number of people who didn't want to join the cabinet. Now I don't know that that applies to the justice and interior ministers. I didn't hear about those portfolios whether they were being offered to people. But I did hear about other portfolios being offered to people. A lot of people are sort of in the revolutionary climate, with the hope of free and fair politics ahead are being very careful and maybe don't want to be associated with a cabinet now under military rule, or they aren't really sure of when the transitional period is coming. That is also part of the problem. I think they probably need to look for some more technocratic type of ministers; people who don't necessarily have some type of political ambition going forward, but would be willing to serve their country this time. My sense is, I said that this cabinet is not going to be satisfactory and there might well be more protests.

Ms. Ellis: The next question I have is about the economy. That, as you mentioned, is one of the key grievances. Egypt has lost tourism, lost revenue; there are a lot of educated people who are unemployed. I am just wondering if you could elaborate a little more about the impact on Egypt and the rest of the region because when you look at Libya, you have the whole issue of oil. And so this is very much on everyone's mind.

Ms. Dunne: Right, well there is no question that these are huge disruptions. We've certainly seen in tourism in Egypt and oil prices going up because of Libya and Egypt, concerns about the Suez Canal, as an important checkpoint for shipping and so forth. Look, I do think Egypt is going to try to run the Suez Canal properly and keep it open. I don't think we have to worry about that. Tourism will return eventually. Egypt has irresistible assets for tourism; so every time in the past when there have been terrorist attacks or something that disrupts tourism, it always comes back in Egypt because there's so much there. I more concerned about what kind of economic philosophy—what kind of economic development philosophy that Egypt is going to have going forward. I think—unfortunately I hear a lot of unrealistic thinking on the part of people apart of the uprising: “Oh, if we could just recapture the assets of corrupt senior officials—those billions, those tens of billions—then all our problems would be solved. Confiscate all that money and redistribute it and everyone will have plenty.” Well, first of all it never happens that way. Second of all that will never address the fundamental structural problems in Egypt, and which economic and social problems, like education—I think the Egyptian educational system has really gotten very, very poor. So I don't see a lot of good thinking yet in Egypt about how they are going to move forward. Right now they are just thinking emergency measures. I think in this situation, the United States and the international community are being called upon to contribute money toward things that we normally wouldn't want to do, like paying subsidies for commodities in Egypt. That's the sort of thing we tried to get the Egyptian Government out of doing for many, many years, and now we have to support that, let's hope only the short term.

Ms. Ellis: Can you comment a little more about what the US and Europe should be doing?

Ms. Dunne: Are you talking economically, or over all?

Ms. Ellis: Over all in terms of support policy.

Ms. Dunne: Well I think it's very important to the United States and Europe for Egypt to make a successful transition to democratic government. I don't think it'll be easy and I don't think it'll be quick. But it's really important that Egypt eventually get there because if Egypt were to get stuck in some sort of military rule or other authoritarian rule, it's just a question of time until we see another explosion of some kind. I don't think that will be a stable pattern going forward. So we're going to have to try to engage; we're going to have to try to beef up our engagement with Egyptian society, as well as the Egyptian Government. But we're not in control of this situation. We are outsiders and we'll try to offer assistance where we can. I do think the whole US aid package to Egypt needs to be rethought at this

point. I'm not saying cancelled, but I think redistributed. We've been giving a billion and a half dollars in aid for the last several years—the aid package used to be even higher than that. But most of that has been military aid: \$1.3 billion military aid and about \$250 million economic aid. I think in this situation it needs to be discussed and thought about and probably there should be—I don't know how feasible it is in our budget for us to be giving more aid overall, but at a minimum, the distribution of military versus economic aid, economic development aid, democracy aid needs to be totally rethought.

Question: Odeh Aburdene. Michele excellent presentation. When you look at the youth movement today and you look at society, they are the new heroes. They have inspired young Arabs from Morocco, to Yemen, to Libya. How do we make sure we don't lose that youth movement? Because that youthful movement is a new force and Egypt is going to be the center of Arab politics. So how does the Administration plan to gain the goodwill of these young men because if we lose them the Middle East will be unstable, undemocratic, and violent?

Isabel Jasinowski: I wanted to provide the follow-up because actually it was on my mind from the beginning, but you teased us with this follow-up question about the Muslim Brotherhood. Could you tell us a little bit about what you anticipate the role it will play both in Egypt and how it will hook into the region generally?

Question: My name is Helena Cobban and I am the owner of Just World Books. I have been live tweeting the whole thing on my Just World Books Twitter account, just in case anybody wants to see what you said. I have a question, you were talking about how last November's elections—in essence, I completely agree with you—set the stage for what happened in January and February, and that the elections were essentially stolen by Mubarak. Can you explain to us why the Obama Administration did not do anything more effective in the lead-up to those elections, given that elections aren't a onetime event; it's a process in the previous months, to intervene to make sure the elections had the basics of being free and fair, given that they weren't and that helped to lead to the explosion of the revolution. What is the lesson for US policy in the region and elsewhere regarding the serious engagement with democratization?

Ms. Dunne: Okay, great. So, Odeh's question, when you started asking the question I thought you were going to ask what the Arab leaders should be doing not to lose the youth. But then you pointed to talking about the United States; but I think it's a question for both. We've seen these tremendous youthful energies and sense of empowerment now in these countries. It's a real question, "youth unemployment and underemployment are the main things that led up to the uprisings that we've seen; so that's why I was placing this emphasis on viable economic reform and development plans because how are you going to generate jobs for those people and also prepare them adequately with education for those jobs." In Egypt and some other countries, Saudi Arabia for example, that's a major issue that people aren't being prepared properly through the educational system, including university education for the kinds of jobs that are going to be available, that they need. Education I think is going to be important. I also think that in politics there's going to have to be more room for young people. Young people in political organizations I think, I feel like they're held back from positions of influence or go to people who are 60 and over and there's really no room for people in their 30s and 40s, let alone their 20s, to rise to positions of leadership and so forth. It is very rare for people to do that. There are talks in some places, like Egypt, of forming youth political parties. Yes, I agree this is a major issue. In terms of the United States and this young generation, look we are playing catch up here because I do think the United States didn't pay as much attention to these issues as it should have to show that we are on the right side of history and we're with the change. I think there's a real question in the minds of these young people about that.

The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, I think there are things to be concerned about and things not to be concerned about. Let me tickle first the things I am not concerned about when it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. You hear people saying, "Oh, in a chaotic situation a well organized organization like the Muslim Brotherhood can take control." I do not see the Muslim Brotherhood

positioning them to carry out a coup of some kind, to literally take control through some sort of extralegal means. The Brotherhood is a fairly conservative organization and they are sort of patient and restrain themselves in many ways, at least in Egypt. I'm not necessarily speaking about all the different branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, they are sort of independently operated in slightly different ways; but I think in Egypt this is the case. I am not worried about the next president of Egypt being a Muslim Brother because the Brotherhood has already announced it would not put up a candidate for the presidency. They've said this so often that I don't expect them to go back on that. Now things that are more realistic things to be worried about; in parliamentary elections, if the Muslim Brotherhood were to be able to capture two-thirds of the seats in parliament or to form a coalition with other political movements to control two-thirds of the seats of parliament, they could carry out amendments to the constitution. They are in favor of changing the political system of Egypt to a parliamentary system, where the president would have very little power and be largely ceremonial, and the government would arise out of the elected government. If they won the parliamentary elections they would be allowed to form the government and that sort of thing. One of the Brotherhood spokesmen said recently we're not going to do that, we're not going to try to get a majority of the parliament, let alone two-thirds. So I think the Brotherhood is trying to send out reassuring signals. With that being said, we do have to be realistic. They have very illiberal positions on a lot of issues: on the rights of women, on the rights of non-Muslims, on the attitude of the United States, and their attitude toward Israel. I don't mean to say that if the Muslim Brotherhood were to control the Egyptian Parliament there would be absolutely no problem for us in the United States and everyone else. Potentially it is a problem. But there is no way to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from politics in Egypt and yet carry out democratization. They are much too much of a political force and they will have to be there. And I do think other political forces in Egypt, in a free environment will play a role in moderating the Brotherhood. We've seen this over recent years, pushing the Brotherhood on its positions. Just to tell a quick anecdote, I remember there was a demonstration a few years ago where the Muslim Brotherhood and Kefaya, this group that I mentioned, held together a political demonstration. In the demonstration some of the Muslim Brothers started holding up little copies of the Koran and the Kefaya protesters said, "Wait a minute. Stop right here. Before we demonstrate with you we need to know something. If Egypt were to become a democracy where do you think the source of authority would be? Do you think the source of authority would be people or would it be God?" The Muslim Brotherhood actually had to go and discuss that amongst themselves and came back and said "Okay, it'd be the people." [Laughter.] "Okay, then we're good." We have to let Egyptians work this out for themselves. I also think as the United States we have to be in favor of democracy and we have to be in favor of human rights, and in favor of Egyptians having their universal human rights in whatever system evolves.

Helena's question on the Obama Administration, why didn't they do anything more effective regarding the parliamentary elections? I was one of the people who were pestering them about this for some time before these elections. I think that when Obama came into office there was a sense of when President Bush carried out this freedom agenda and it was a big mess, they wanted to jettison all of that. Unfortunately what had happened, I think in the first year of the Obama Administration, the whole idea of democracy and human rights as a part of our foreign policy had just dropped off the screen; it wasn't even there, this wasn't only about the Middle East, it was about China and a lot of other countries. Gradually, in about the second year of the Obama Administration they started talking about human rights and democracy as a part of our foreign policy and articulating positions on it. But frankly all of these things were moving forward very slowly, and then we see these elections coming up in Egypt. And there were those of us who were pestering them and saying, "What are you going to do about this?" What they did was raised with the Egyptian Government—President Obama raised with President Mubarak two specific things: please lift the state of emergency, as President Mubarak promised to do in 2005, and please allow international observers at your elections. Of course it was understood that that would drive improvements to their electoral system if they were going to have international, as well as Egyptian monitors, at the elections. President Mubarak turned both of these down absolutely flat. My criticism of the Obama Administration was that there was really no type of strategy behind this. They raised these issues with Egyptian officials in private meetings and they also said them publicly; but they never put anything on the table and never tried to create any positive

incentives and disincentives or any way to persuade the Egyptian Government to try to do these things. To me that's what you do when you're serious about a goal. Here I think it was a goal in the early stages of thinking in the Obama Administration. They had just gotten that far with their thinking about it and then we see the whole region explode. So what's the lesson? We need to take these issues, the internal affairs of countries, far more seriously as a part of our policies. They were just given a very, very low priority for such a long time.

Question: My name is Amal Mudallali. My question is—I actually have two questions. My first one is actually the most important one. I want to go back to the youth question and more importantly Facebook, and the internet generation and the Arab world. As you know from the last few years these people were going above the heads of their government and above the heads of their parents into the outside world and learning new values that they were not raised with; as we saw with the Egyptians and Tunisians, they were raising questions of liberalism, of freedom, and of things that were Western values. I was wondering from your study on this issue if this new generation is less anti-American than the generation because they were not indoctrinated in the traditional Arab media that was usually anti-American. My second question is—maybe you could touch on it—the foreign minister was not changed, does that mean that Egyptian foreign policy was doing very well? What does this mean actually for keeping him; does he have good relations with people in the cabinet? Thank you.

Question: Thank you Michele for a nice talk. I'm Louise Gresham with NTI. I was intrigued by your almost long lineage of patterns and triggers that you observed. And yet when we do disease prediction we collect data to try to predict what is going to happen, so we can do an intervention. Can you tell us more about how you share data that you collect, who you share data with? Is it collected to be able to do interventions? Or do we just hope people aren't surprised? Thank you.

Question: Hi, my name is Trisha Curtis and I'm with the Energy Policy Research Foundation. I don't want to take away from your economic speech or anything because it was wonderful, but I do want to highlight the structural differences that are happening with other countries. We did see blips in the oil market and everything; but it seems to me that it seems to be much more of an issue to me now because we are beginning to see countries produce a lot more oil and actually exporting it. I was wondering if you could touch on that a little more.

Ms. Dunne: Okay, Amal, your question, is this new generation less anti-American? From my observation, I think this new generation is more focused on domestic affairs in their countries. It's not that they don't care at all. They still do care about some foreign policy issues: they certainly have opinions about them and care about the Palestinian issue. They have opinions. But I think there was some kind of change in which they sort of began to blame the problems in their countries less on outside factors and foreign powers, also to look less to the outside to bring about change in their countries. I think for some of that I do credit satellite television and I think increasingly told people a lot more about what was going on in their own countries than they had known before. And in a country like Egypt for example, the advent of Al Jazeera touched off a process by which you had commercially or independently owned media emerging and competing with the pan Arab media. So people began to learn more and more information about what was going on inside their countries.

Now regarding Egyptian foreign policy, I think that whatever government comes out of this, particularly after elections, is going to be more responsive to domestic opinions when it comes to foreign policy than the Mubarak Government was. That's not going to necessarily lead them in ways that are going to please the United States all the time. I heard predictions that this could not be far from the truth that if the Egyptian democratic transition goes successfully we might see Egypt having a foreign policy that looks a little more like Turkey's than looks like the old Egyptian Government's. So I think they're going to have a different balance in their attention with foreign and domestic affairs than was the case in the past when people in a lot of Arab countries were extremely discouraging from paying attention to domestic affairs and all their attention was what was going on outside. I don't think that's going to be

the case anymore. At the same time we might see the Egyptian Government feistier on some of the issues that do matter to their public in foreign policy.

Louise asked about how we share data, collect on these issues, and do interventions. Alright, I have to confess on this, I am a social scientist; we are much less systematic on these things. I think as Patricia mentioned I edit this journal called the *Arab Reform Bulletin* and I work at a think tank. What we do is write, we write up analyses and commission analyses from people on questions that we think are important and we try to get these out. Some of them do—the things that we write at Carnegie—do specific policy recommendations and then we try to meet with people and so forth to try to promote the specific policy recommendations; so that's how we try to go about it. I mentioned that I am part of something called the Working Group on Egypt, which was an effort from people across different parts of the political spectrum to try to come to together on this issue of Egypt, and try to formulate exactly what we were concerned about and what the US Government should be doing, and then have a pretty targeted campaign about going out to people in the Administration and in Congress and so forth about that. So that was a little more systematic effort.

So Trisha, on the oil markets, this is not particularly my specialty but obviously Egypt is not a major producer, so the concern there was the Suez Canal. As long as the Suez Canal is open and Egypt is stable then I don't think it will cause a little bit of a blip. Libya, of course, is a major producer, particularly for Europe. That's going to have a more profound effect if we see more happening in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has been quiet, but if we see other countries in the Gulf heating up then it's going to mean higher prices

Question: Hi, I'm Brian Bennett from the *Los Angeles Times*. Thanks so much for your explanations of some of the forces that led up to the Egypt protests. I am interested in social media and the role that it played. A lot of NGOs have been working with civil society groups in the area for quite a few years and incorporating social media into their capacity building. I am wondering if some of these groups are funded by USAID, DRL, NED? Do you think this is money well spent? Should money in this regard be laid out by the tax payers?

Susan Rappaport: I am Susan Rappaport and I am on the Board of the Women's Foreign Policy Group. Thank you so much for your enlightening explanation. It was really wonderful. But I am curious to know about the role of women in the new Egypt with the young protesters.

Question: Suzanne Danis, the Defense Group. I was curious about what creep you see moving toward Saudi Arabia. You mentioned Saudi Arabia; do you see instability coming their way? Are they ready for it? Do you see anything happening?

Ms. Dunne: Brian's question about social media. There were programs that promoted the use of social media, and networking among activists in different countries throughout the region. I don't know if it was to the magnitude to make a difference. I think these programs were on to the right thing in a sense that these are important phenomena and that the United States may have made a small contribution here. I don't have the sense that these programs made all the difference. And I do think going ahead that it's going to be important to help these young people find their way contributing to the society, whether in jobs, in political parties, in those kinds of things as well.

The role of women in the new Egypt. So far we are not seeing a lot of progress quickly on this. There are no women on the constitutional reform committee that was appointed, even though there are some women judges in Egypt. They could have included a woman. We are not seeing women in major roles in the cabinet. And we are certainly not seeing women on the Supreme Military Council. Now the one thing that the ruling party did in terms of political reform was to institute a quota for women in the parliament—I guess it's 12% of the seats are allocated the women. In the last elections up until then women were elected in very small numbers in Egyptian politics. So that will be really interesting. I don't see anyone at this point propose to do away with the women's quota in parliament. I think a lot of the

reformers in Egypt said, "That's fine. We are fine with a women's quota in parliament." They didn't want to see the ruling party totally monopolize those seats, which is what happened in the last parliamentary election. So that's a discussion yet to come, the exact rules that will govern the next parliamentary election and the political system. But certainly there has been a problem up until now with women—there have always been a couple of women in the cabinet and so forth but there've been only a few political parties that have had women in high positions. I would also mention that, nobody asked about this, but Christians, who make up about 10% of the population of Egypt, have historically been very underrepresented in electoral politics.

Saudi Arabia, let me say this, a lot of the problems that led to the uprisings in these other countries exist in Saudi Arabia: the youth bulge, the youth, unemployment, and underemployment. There's been a real problem with the educational system in Saudi Arabia, not preparing people for jobs, and also maybe Saudis having unrealistic earning expectations, so better qualified foreigners who are willing to take a lower salary get all these positions. This has been a problem that nobody has been quite able to solve yet. Although there are some educational reforms under way. There's a technological university in Saudi Arabia trying to prepare people with technical skills. Also Saudi society is at a very different place too than what we saw in places like Egypt and even Tunisia. Obviously the role of women in public life has been much, much less in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia doesn't even have an elected parliament. The only elections that they have held have been for municipal councils. There are no political parties. There are NGOs, but they're much less developed than in other Arab countries. So we've not seen significant demonstrations so far in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is also maybe approaching succession; it's sort of perennial succession nowadays because of the old age of the leaders who succeed to the monarchy. It's hard to predict. I think there are other places. I really wasn't surprised to see demonstrations in Bahrain and very strong demonstrations. That's a place where things have been more at a simmer for a while. We really haven't seen that much in Saudi Arabia and we really just need to keep an eye on it, but a lot of the underlying grievances are there.

Ms. Ellis: Michele, I want to take this opportunity to thank you for such an absolutely wonderful, informative, and interesting evening and we all learned a lot. Thank you so much. [*Applause.*]